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DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW”
Matthew J. Lindsay*
Abstract
Courts and scholars have long noted the constitutional
exceptionalism of the federal immigration power, decried the injustice it
produces, and appealed for greater constitutional protection for
noncitizens. This Article builds on this robust literature while focusing
on a particularly critical conceptual and doctrinal obstacle to legal
reform—the notion that laws governing the rights of noncitizens to enter
and remain within the United States comprise a distinct body of
“immigration laws” presumed to be part and parcel of foreign affairs and
national security.
This Article argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent immigration
jurisprudence suggests a willingness to temper, and perhaps even retire,
that presumption. In particular, the majority opinions in Zadvydas v.
Davis and Padilla v. Kentucky evidence a growing skepticism among the
Justices that the regulation of noncitizens comprises a discrete,
constitutionally privileged domain of distinctly “political” subject matter
that is properly buffered against judicial scrutiny.
To rescind that presumption would, in effect, disaggregate the
category of “immigration law” for the purpose of constitutional review
and subject federal authority over noncitizens to the same judicially
enforceable constitutional constraints that apply to most other federal
lawmaking. The disaggregation of immigration law would thus give full
expression to noncitizens’ constitutional personhood. Foreign policy and
national security considerations would continue to serve as
constitutionally viable warrants for laws burdening noncitizens, but
Congress and the President would no longer enjoy the extraordinary
judicial deference that they currently receive as a matter of course.
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I. THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POWER ......................................189
A. Plenary Federal Power, in Theory .................................189
B. Classification Trouble: What Is an
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INTRODUCTION
Immigration occupies a paradoxical position in American law and
political culture. On the one hand, the United States enthusiastically
celebrates its heritage as a “nation of immigrants” and has long
embraced the “melting pot” as a central metaphor of civic identity. For
the past half-century, in particular, federal law governing eligibility for
admission to the United States has generally reflected this inclusive,
pluralistic heritage.1 On the other hand, for more than a century, the
1. Congress repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1943, though immigration from
China remained extremely limited for another two decades as the result of the miniscule
immigration quotas allocated to nations in the “Asia-Pacific triangle.” Act of June 23, 1913, ch.
3, § 1, 38 Stat. 65, repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600. Congress
abandoned the limitation of eligibility for naturalization to “free white persons”—a limitation
first adopted in the Naturalization Act of 1790—in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
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U.S. Supreme Court has maintained that noncitizens and the laws that
govern them are constitutionally exceptional, outside of and largely
insulated from mainstream constitutional norms.2 When the federal
government banishes a noncitizen from the country or detains her for
months or years at a time, for example, she does not enjoy many of the
constitutional protections to which she, as a constitutional “person,”
would otherwise be entitled.3 As a result, noncitizens in the United
States operate under a deep and enduring estrangement from the
American constitutional community. This estrangement stands in sharp
contrast not only to the nation’s prevailing, if still contested, cultural
(INA), also known as the McCarran–Walter Act. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103,
repealed by Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 84-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
Yet it was not until the Immigration Act of 1965 that the civil rights revolution finally came to
immigration law. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law:
A New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 300–02
(1996) (documenting that racial egalitarianism motivated many of the Immigration Act’s
leading sponsors). The 1965 Act eliminated the near-total exclusion for seven decades of
immigrants from nations in the Asia-Pacific triangle, and abandoned the National Origins Quota
system, which had severely restricted immigration from countries outside of western and
northern Europe since the 1920s. Id. at 303, 316 & n.193; Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965). Notwithstanding the racially egalitarian intent and effect of the Act,
however, its liberalizing impulse was not without substantial limits. See Kevin R. Johnson, The
Beginning of the End: The Immigration Act of 1965 and the Emergence of Modern U.S./Mexico
Border Enforcement 35, 38 (U.C. Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 360,
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2362478 (arguing that the 1965 Act’s
“artificial” numerical cap on migration from the Western Hemisphere represents a quite
deliberate, though more sophisticated and less visible, intention to restrict Latino immigration to
the United States); see also Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The Racially
Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s SB 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration
Reform, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 313, 315 (2012) (documenting various ways in which federal
immigration law, as well as state laws such as Arizona S.B. 1070, “readily provide color-blind,
facially neutral proxies” for race and, “in the aggregate, [allow for racial discrimination] without
the need for the express (and delegitimizing) reliance on race, on a massive scale”); Elizabeth
Keyes, Race and Immigration, Then and Now: How the Shift to “Worthiness” Undermines the
1965 Immigration Law’s Civil Rights Goals, 57 HOWARD L.J. 899, 902, 910–15 (2014)
(discussing the “erosion of the 1965 Act’s egalitarian goals” by the racially disparate impacts of
workplace, national security, and criminal law enforcement).
2. See infra Section I.A.
3. See infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. This constitutional estrangement was
the product of a deep undercurrent—at once cultural, economic, and racial—of apprehension
about the meaning of mass immigration for the quality of the nation’s economic and political
life. That apprehension found expression historically in a host of remarkably illiberal
movements and policies that have colored American immigration policy, particularly before the
mid-twentieth century. See generally Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion:
Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 40–51 (2010) [hereinafter Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion]; Matthew J. Lindsay,
Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 746–49
(2013) [hereinafter Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness].
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and political ethic of inclusiveness, but also the Constitution’s
denomination of “persons,” rather than “citizens,” as the beneficiaries of
key constitutional protections.4
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s recent immigration
jurisprudence suggests a growing skepticism among the Justices that the
regulation of noncitizens comprises a discrete, constitutionally
privileged domain of distinctly “political” subject matter that is properly
buffered against judicial scrutiny. To rescind that presumption would
effectively disaggregate the category of “immigration law” for the
purpose of constitutional review, and subject federal authority over
immigrants and immigration to the same judicially enforceable
constitutional constraints that apply to most other federal lawmaking.
The disaggregation of immigration law would thus give full expression
to noncitizens’ constitutional personhood.
To better understand the terms and stakes of immigrants’
constitutional estrangement, consider Mathews v. Diaz,5 a staple of
modern constitutional immigration law. In 1972, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services denied the Medicaid applications of three
elderly noncitizens—Cuban refugees Santiago Diaz and José Clara, and
permanent resident Victor Espinosa—because they could not satisfy a
statutory five-year residency requirement.6 When Diaz, Clara, and
Espinosa challenged the residency requirement as an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection,7 they had reason to be hopeful. The Supreme
Court in Graham v. Richardson had recently applied strict scrutiny to a
state law conditioning eligibility for welfare benefits on a period of
residency and struck down the residency provision as an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection.8 Because “[a]liens as a class
4. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect “persons” without regard to
citizenship. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged as much
when reviewing state laws discriminating on the basis of alienage. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (observing that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment were “universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality”). The First
Amendment is framed as a general restraint on Congress. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The only
potentially meaningful exception is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits the states from “abridg[ing] the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.” Id. amend. XIV.
5. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
6. Id. at 69–70.
7. Id. at 70–71. Specifically, the petitioners argued that the residency requirement
violated the equal protection guarantee incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by the Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (declaring that equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment “is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment”).
8. 403 U.S. 365, 372, 382–83 (1971).
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are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority,” the Graham
Court declared, “classifications based on alienage, like those based on
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny.”9 Yet the Diaz Court had little difficulty upholding the
analogous federal statute. Because “the relationship between the United
States and our alien visitors . . . may implicate our relations with foreign
powers,” the Court explained, the responsibility of regulating
noncitizens had been “committed to the political branches of the Federal
Government.”10 The same “reasons that preclude judicial review of
political questions” therefore “dictate[d] a narrow standard of review of
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of
immigration and naturalization.”11
This constitutional diffidence has two curious features. First, there is
a striking mismatch between the quintessentially domestic subject
matter of the challenged statute—eligibility for federal Medicare
benefits—and the Court’s rationale for deferring to the political
judgment of Congress—the asserted connection between the regulation
of noncitizens and the conduct of foreign affairs.12 Second, the Court
simply assumes without discussion that the challenged provision
constituted a regulation of “immigration,” even though Medicare
eligibility has no obvious bearing on any immigrant’s right to enter into
or remain within the United States—the conventional indices of an
immigration law.13 These curiosities in the Diaz Court’s reasoning are
symptoms of the Court’s very peculiar legal construction of the federal
immigration power, known as the “plenary power doctrine.” Under the
plenary power doctrine, federal authority to regulate immigration does
not derive from any constitutionally enumerated power but is rather “an
incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United
States.”14 The authority is thus extra-constitutional and exclusive to the
9. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
10. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81.
11. Id. at 81–82.
12. See id. Federal courts of appeal rejected similar constitutional challenges to the 1996
Welfare Reform Act on the same grounds. See infra note 357.
13. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 79–80; see also De Canas v. BICA, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976)
(defining the “regulation of immigration” as “essentially a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may
remain”).
14. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
The Court first grounded the federal immigration power in national sovereignty in the 1889
Chinese Exclusion Case, and it remains there to this day. For the classic formulation of the
plenary power doctrine, see id. at 606–09; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705
(1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
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federal government; moreover, its exercise by Congress or the President
is buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional constraints. 15 As
the quoted language from Diaz suggests, the Court justifies the
constitutional exceptionalism of the immigration power with reference
to the purportedly intricate connection between immigration regulation
and “basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign
relations and the national security.”16
When a noncitizen encounters governmental authority outside of the
immigration context—for example, as an employee, criminal defendant,
or business licensee—he enjoys the same slate of constitutional
protections afforded to citizens.17 The moment a court determines that a
federal law or enforcement action qualifies as a regulation of
immigration per se, however, it triggers a constitutionally exceptional
authority, the exercise of which lies largely beyond the scope of
constitutional review.18 This is true even when the constitutional
protection being asserted—for example, the First Amendment or the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause—makes no distinction between
“persons” and “citizens.”19 Nor does it matter whether the underlying
basis for removal bears even a colorable connection to foreign affairs or
national security—for example, whether the noncitizen in question is a
suspected terrorist mastermind or a teenage petty criminal. The
consequences for noncitizens are often profound. Even long-term legal
residents lack robust constitutional protections against improper
detention during lengthy removal proceedings20 or selection for removal
15. This is not to suggest that the plenary power doctrine always wholly immunizes
immigration-related federal lawmaking from meaningful constitutional review. As the Article
discusses below (see infra note 358), Justice Stevens’s unanimous opinion in Diaz does
undertake a conscientious, if still highly deferential, form of rational basis review before
concluding that the challenged alienage classification was “unquestionably reasonable” and not
“wholly irrational.” Id. at 83. See also infra note 25 and accompanying text.
16. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); see also, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S.
510, 522 (2003) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For
background on the heightened national security cast of both political debate over immigration
policy and constitutional immigration law in the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, see
Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National
Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2007) and Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo,
Immigration Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American
Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1370–71 (2007).
17. See infra notes 205–07 and accompanying text; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
18. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
19. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, XIV.
20. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.
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based on otherwise constitutionally protected speech or associations.21
Scholars and courts alike have long noted the constitutional
exceptionalism of federal immigration regulation, decried the injustice
that it produces, and called for greater constitutional protection for
noncitizens.22 This Article builds on this literature but refocuses critical
attention on a key but under-analyzed conceptual and doctrinal obstacle
to legal reform: the notion that laws and regulations governing the rights
of noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States comprise a
discrete body of immigration laws that are presumed to be part and
parcel of foreign affairs and national security.23 It argues that this
21. See Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999).
22. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION,
THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 196 (2002); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:
OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15–20 (2007); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13–14 (1996) (describing the
“immigration anomaly”); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998) (characterizing immigration as a legal “maverick” and
“wild card”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution, 7
CONST. COMMENT. 9–10 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984); Hiroshi Motomura, The
Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional
Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1704 (1992) (noting the “singularity” of immigration)
[hereinafter Motomura, Curious Evolution]; Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International
Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999)
[hereinafter Motomura, Federalism] (defining “‘immigration exceptionalism’ . . . as the view
that immigration and alienage law should be exempt from the usual limits on government
decisionmaking”). But see Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 257–58 (2000) (arguing that the Court’s review of various
discriminatory grounds for exclusion and deportation “may not be that different from how it has
treated those groups domestically” and that “many of the terrible immigration cases could have
come out the same way even if they involved the rights of citizens under domestic constitutional
law”).
23. One might plausibly object that, although the foundational nineteenth-century plenary
power cases did ground immigration exceptionalism squarely in foreign affairs and national
security, the modern justification for the doctrine is considerably broader and more varied, and
includes rationales that cannot easily be dismissed as inaccurate or anachronistic. Professor
Hiroshi Motomura, for one, defends a discrete form of “immigration exceptionalism” with
respect to federal exclusivity on the ground that immigration law and policy is “part of a project
of national self-definition.” Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and
Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1374 (1999). Although it is true that
immigration implicates distinctly national interests in ways that are highly relevant to
constitutional immigration law (particularly with respect to federalism), my focus on the foreign
affairs/national security rationale is nevertheless warranted because that rationale continues to
do the lion’s share of rhetorical work in justifying the insulation of immigration-related
lawmaking from constitutional review. See infra notes 406–17 and accompanying text
(discussing Demore v. Kim); see also David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power
Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (2015) (arguing that the strong and continuing linkage
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presumption is descriptively and analytically incoherent, and that its
incoherence has produced a cascade of doctrinal confusion and
substantive injustice. The Supreme Court should instead disaggregate
immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review and recognize
both federal and state regulation of noncitizens for what it is: a
variegated conglomeration of laws and enforcement actions that
concern labor, crime, public health and welfare, and, sometimes, foreign
affairs and national security.
Under a disaggregated immigration law, courts would no longer
approach the regulation of noncitizens as a distinct, constitutionally
privileged domain of “political” subject matter. Rather, immigrationrelated lawmaking would be recast as a constitutionally ordinary
instance of federal authority, akin to Congress’s “plenary” power to
regulate commerce or to tax and spend for the general welfare. Federal
action toward noncitizens would therefore be constrained by the same
substantive, judicially enforceable constitutional norms that apply to
most other federal lawmaking and enforcement. The disaggregation of
immigration law would thus give full expression to noncitizens’
constitutional personhood; accordingly, regulations that employ a
suspect classification, infringe a fundamental liberty interest, or chill
free expression would be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny.
Foreign policy and national security considerations would continue to
serve as constitutionally viable warrants for laws burdening noncitizens,
but Congress and the President would no longer enjoy the extraordinary
judicial deference that they currently receive as a matter of course.24
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the federal
immigration power, including its history, doctrine, and underlying
rationale. It then argues that the varied legal techniques through which
national and subnational governments attempt to govern noncitizens
defy the basic notion of a legally discrete category of immigration laws
that are functionally distinct from a host of other, non-immigration laws
that shape the lives and migration-related choices of noncitizens.
Part II seeks to dispel the aura of naturalness that surrounds the
plenary power doctrine. It first considers the history of immigrationbetween immigration and foreign affairs explains the durability of the plenary power doctrine in
the face of decades of criticism by scholars and advocates).
24. See infra notes 346–55 and accompanying text. The disaggregation of immigration
law likewise would have important consequences for developing “immigration federalism”
jurisprudence. Specifically, and in contrast to the current framework, courts would be able to
acknowledge that the purpose and effect of many recent state and local initiatives is to deter
certain noncitizens from living and working within a given jurisdiction, without rendering such
laws automatically preempted under the plenary power doctrine. See infra notes 102–110, 350
and accompanying text.
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related lawmaking in the century before immigration law emerged as a
discrete legal category. It demonstrates that until the final decades of the
nineteenth century, immigration regulation was an unexceptional aspect
of both the state police power and the federal commerce power. It then
describes a counter-history of plenary federal power—a history of
dissent, criticism, and doubt on the part of not only scholars and
activists, but also many Supreme Court Justices—that refutes the claims
of inevitability that typically characterize defenses of immigration
exceptionalism.
Part III argues that the Supreme Court should disaggregate
immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review. Section III.A
contends that certain recent legal and rhetorical gestures on the part of
the Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis25 and Padilla v. Kentucky26
evidence a growing discomfort among the Justices toward the notion of
a discrete, constitutionally privileged domain of immigration law.
Section III.B considers the constitutional implications of a
disaggregated, unexceptional immigration law in three select doctrinal
contexts: the administration of public benefits, removal, and detention.
Section III.C concludes by briefly sketching a course of doctrinal
development that could plausibly culminate in the disaggregation of
immigration law.
I. THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POWER
This Part provides a brief overview of the modern federal
immigration power, commonly known as the plenary power doctrine.
As Section I.A explains, the plenary power doctrine defines as its object
a legally discrete category of immigration laws that are presumed to be
inextricably linked to the political branches’ regulation of foreign affairs
and national security. Section I.B argues that the notion of a distinct
category of immigration law seriously mischaracterizes the relationship
between immigration-related lawmaking and the actual governance of
foreign migration to and from the United States; and further, that courts
deploy the category instrumentally, as a means of calibrating
constitutional skepticism toward a challenged law.
A. Plenary Federal Power, in Theory
The modern federal immigration power is constitutionally
exceptional in two distinct but interrelated aspects. First, the authority to
regulate immigration does not derive from any enumerated power, but is
rather “an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the
25. 533 U.S. 678, 695–96 (2001).
26. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).
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United States.”27 Second, the federal government’s enactment and
enforcement of immigration laws is buffered against judicially
enforceable constitutional constraints.28
Ever since the Supreme Court first adopted the plenary power
doctrine in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case,29 it has justified this
constitutional exceptionalism with reference to the purportedly intricate
connection between the admission and removal of foreigners and “basic
aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations
and the national security.”30 Because the authority emanates from the
nation’s sovereignty, it is exclusively federal.31 Although state and local
governments can and do govern noncitizens in various ways outside of
the immigration context, once a subnational law or enforcement practice
is understood to implicate “core” immigration functions, it is
structurally preempted under the Supremacy Clause.32 This was not
always the case. The late nineteenth-century Supreme Court refashioned
the federal immigration power from a branch of Congress’s commerce
power adapted to the regulation of labor, economic dependency, and
crime—issues that have always characterized most immigration
lawmaking—to the defense of the nation against foreign invasion.33
Even today, when the Chinese Exclusion Case has long since assumed a
prominent place in the Supreme Court hall of infamy, the Court
continues to reason from the premise that certain laws and enforcement
actions bearing on noncitizens occupy a logically self-evident, legally
27. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
28. See, e.g., id. at 606–09.
29. Id. at 604.
30. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). On the origin of the “national security
rationale” for immigration exceptionalism, see Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion, supra note 3,
at 40.
31. See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion, supra note 3, at 26.
32. Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers,
State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2217–18 (2003).
33. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion, supra note 3, at 6; Lindsay, Constitution of
Foreignness, supra note 3, at 747–48 (“Throughout the nation’s first century, immigrants’ noncitizenship was incidental, or at least secondary, to the nature of the regulatory authority to
which they, as immigrants, were subject. . . . Immigrants were legally reconstructed as
foreigners only in the final decades of the nineteenth century, as Europeans and Chinese
migrants alike increasingly became understood as fundamentally and permanently alien to the
American character. . . . The Supreme Court then translated the discourse of indelible
foreignness into a potent and durable rationale for immigration exceptionalism, forging the
immigration power into an instrument of national ‘self-preservation’ to be deployed against
invading armies of economically degraded, politically unassimilable, racially suspect
foreigners.”).
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discrete category of immigration laws that are part and parcel of foreign
affairs and national security.34 Moreover, the Court perpetuates that
premise even though the social and political judgments that historically
appeared to justify it would strike most contemporary policy makers
and judges as both anachronistic and patently racist.35
Archetypal “immigration regulations” are rules that bear on the right
of noncitizens to enter and remain within a jurisdiction, particularly
federal statutes and regulations that define eligibility for admission to
and grounds for removal from the United States.36 Under this rubric,
immigration laws are conceptually distinct from so-called “alienage
laws,” which target noncitizens for differential treatment but are not
understood to implicate “core” immigration functions.37 Examples
include federal or state provisions excluding noncitizens or a class of
noncitizens from receiving public assistance,38 working without state
authorization,39 or entering particular occupations.40 The Court’s
approach to alienage laws is notoriously opaque. It is reasonably clear
that state alienage laws are generally subject to both conflict preemption
analysis under the Supremacy Clause41 and heightened scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment.42 As a result, they are constitutionally
suspect, but sometimes permissible.43 Yet when reviewing federal
alienage laws, though in theory distinct from immigration regulations
per se, the Court has tended to blur the immigration/alienage boundary
and to show considerable deference.44 Although, as the following
Section will discuss, the immigration/alienage distinction does not hold
up under closer scrutiny, it nevertheless operates as a central premise of
34. Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 746–47.
35. See id. at 748 & n.20, 794–95.
36. See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 341,
360–61 (2008).
37. Id. at 351.
38. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78–79 (1976); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
39. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503–05 (2012).
40. See, e.g., Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116–17 (1976).
41. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500–01.
42. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 642 (1973); Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72.
43. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (upholding
an Arizona law penalizing businesses that hired undocumented workers); Cabell v. ChavezSalido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (upholding a state requirement of U.S. citizenship for “peace
officers”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80–81 (1979) (upholding a state requirement of
U.S. citizenship for public school teachers).
44. See, e.g., Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1978); Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 69–71 (1976).
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a relatively unfettered federal immigration power and shapes the
Court’s recent immigration federalism jurisprudence.
The precise nature of noncitizens’ constitutional estrangement under
the plenary power doctrine is likewise somewhat murky. On some
occasions, the Supreme Court has implied that the substantive
constitutional norms that otherwise constrain congressional power
simply do not apply in the immigration context.45 Yet at other times, the
Court has suggested that constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection do, at least in theory, limit federal authority in
immigration matters, but that the enforcement of those guarantees
against Congress and the Executive Branch is beyond the proper
institutional role of the federal courts.46 Although both readings find
plausible support in the case law, the Court’s highly deferential posture
is best understood as a limitation of the judicial role rather than the
absence of applicable constitutional norms.47
Regardless of the legal-theoretical basis for buffering immigration
regulation against constitutional review, the consequences for
immigration lawmaking and enforcement, and, not least, for noncitizens
themselves, are profound and far-reaching. Congress enjoys virtually
unlimited authority to establish criteria for admission of noncitizens.48
As Justice Felix Frankfurter explained six decades ago, policies
governing the rights of noncitizens to enter or remain within the U.S.
“are for Congress exclusively to determine even though such
45. See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373,
384–86 (discussing the “unlimited congressional power” conception of the plenary power
doctrine and citing various judicial opinions employing that conception).
46. Professor Adam Cox proposes a third plausible reading of the insulation of immigration
law against constitutional review: that “the plenary power doctrine is principally a doctrine of
standing,” under which “aliens lack the right to seek meaningful judicial review of the
constitutionality of immigration policy.” Id. at 278, 389.
47. As this Article discusses, the Court’s self-conscious construction of federal statutes to
avoid constitutional difficulties only makes sense if the Justices believe that substantive
constitutional norms do, or at least should, apply to immigration regulation. See infra notes 295–
23 and accompanying text. Consider, too, the Diaz Court’s reference to the political question
doctrine. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81–82 (“The reasons that preclude judicial review of political
questions also dictate[d] a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress or the
President in the area of immigration and naturalization.” (footnote omitted)). The Court is not
literally invoking the political question doctrine in the sense of declaring that immigration
regulation is nonjusticiable. Rather, it is suggesting that, similar to the way that certain issues
raise nonjusticiable political questions, the subject matter involved in immigration regulation—
specifically, “our relations with foreign powers”—warrants judicial restraint (i.e. “a narrow
standard of review”), though not abstention. See id. (emphasis added). For a persuasive analysis
of this issue, see ALEINIKOFF, supra note 22, at 153–59.
48. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
766 (1972).
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determination may be deemed to offend American traditions.”49
It is perhaps in the context of removal (formerly called
“deportation”) that the relative absence of judicially enforceable
constitutional constraints is most conspicuous.50 Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly recognized that deportation often “visits a great hardship on
the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in
this land of freedom.”51 Although the INA affords noncitizens certain
due process rights during removal proceedings,52 even those who have
lived in the United States legally for decades lack robust constitutional
protections against selection for removal based on otherwise
constitutionally protected speech or associations,53 or against
unwarranted detention during lengthy removal proceedings.54 Further,
while it “cannot be doubted” that “deportation is a penalty,”55 it is
technically a civil proceeding rather than criminal punishment;
therefore, noncitizens subject to removal are denied the suite of rights

49. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
When a noncitizen is denied entry at the border, and even detained for an extended period,
“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process.” Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950); see also Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (quoting
Knauff and agreeing that Congress has the ultimate authority to deny entry to an alien). On the
difficulties involved in allocating rights based on this territorial distinction, see Charles D.
Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and
Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995). But see Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33
(1982) (noting that although “an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a
privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, . . . . a continuously present
permanent resident alien [seeking reentry to the United States] has a right to due process”).
50. The term “removal” now encompasses both deportation and inadmissibility. See
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2012). For an enlightening history of
deportation policy and process, see generally KANSTROOM, supra note 22 (analyzing “the nature
and history of a particular exertion of U.S. government power over noncitizens: its power to
detain and to deport”); Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803
(2013).
51. E.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945). As Justice Hugo Black explained
sixty years ago, a noncitizen facing deportation stands to lose “his job, his friends, his home, and
maybe even his children, who must choose between their father and their native country.”
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
52. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a noncitizen receive written notice
to appear, which informs him of the nature of the proceeding, the charges against him, and the
legal authority under which the proceedings are conducted. 8 U.S.C. § 1229–29a. A noncitizen
is afforded “a reasonable opportunity to examine evidence against [him], to present evidence on
[his] own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government” and the right to
be represented by counsel “at no expense to the Government.” Id. §§ 1229a(4)(A)–(B).
53. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1999);
Galvan, 347 U.S. at 523.
54. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003).
55. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154.
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that protect criminal defendants against governmental abuses.56 As a
result, a noncitizen facing removal does not receive a Miranda
warning,57 does not have a Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel,58 cannot suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment,59 cannot challenge the retroactive application of new
grounds for removal as a violation of the ex post facto clause of Article
I,60 and is not entitled to a conscientious review of his removal order.61
The stakes of this legal state of affairs for millions of noncitizens
could hardly be higher. Over the past two decades, both the number of
removable noncitizens and the number of actual removals have
exploded. After fluctuating between 3900 and 38,500 deportations
annually for most of the twentieth century, the number surged in the
1990s,62 especially following the adoption of two federal statutes in
199663: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)64
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
56. But see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010) (holding that a defense
attorney’s failure to inform a noncitizen criminal defendant of the likely immigration
consequences of a guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of
the Sixth Amendment).
57. United States v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568–69 (6th Cir. 1975).
59. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
60. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593–95 (1952).
61. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2012) (severely limiting judicial review of removal orders). As
Professor Daniel Kanstroom explains, a noncitizen who appeals a removal order may “receive a
summary decision made by a single member of the understaffed and overwhelmed Board of
Immigration Appeals produced after a ten-minute review of his case.” If the noncitizen appeals
to a federal court, “he may well find that the court declines review of ‘discretionary’ questions,
such as his potential eligibility for ‘relief’ from removal.” KANSTROOM, supra note 22, at 4; see
also Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 392–95 (2006) (describing the paucity of constitutional protection in
immigration proceedings relative to the criminal context). It is stark testimony to the
inadequacies of the current immigration adjudication system that there are several documented
cases of U.S. citizens being denied entry or erroneously deported, based on the mistaken
conclusion that they were noncitizens. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking
Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 1971–80 (2013). For an overview of the
daunting inadequacies of the underfunded, understaffed, and politicized immigration
adjudication system, see generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1645–76 (2010).
62. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2012, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/publication/yearbook-immigration-statistics2012-enforcement-actions (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Yearbook of Immigration
Statistics].
63. Walter A. Ewing, The Growth of the U.S. Deportation Machine, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/growth-us-deportationmachine.
64. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
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(IIRIRA).65 The laws radically expanded the statutory grounds for
exclusion and deportation, applied new grounds for deportation
retroactively, and eliminated certain discretionary waivers of
deportability.66 As a result, deportations more than doubled, from fewer
than 51,000 in 1995 to more than 114,000 in 1997.67 The number of
noncitizens confined in federal detention facilities during the pendency
of removal proceedings has swelled accordingly, to more than
440,000.68 In 2013, the most recent year for which the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security has reported removal statistics, the number stood
at 438,000.69 Notwithstanding President Barack Obama’s declared
policy of exercising prosecutorial discretion to focus removal efforts on
noncitizens who “pose a danger to national security or a risk to public
safety,”70 as well as the 2012 initiative to provide legal status to certain
undocumented noncitizens brought to the United States as children,71
the Obama Administration has overseen more removals annually than
any of his predecessors. During President George W. Bush’s eight years
in office, the United States removed just over 2,000,000 noncitizens;72
President Obama’s administration surpassed that number in April
2014—only sixteen months into the President’s second term.
B. Classification Trouble: What Is an “Immigration Law”?
Modern constitutional immigration law is premised on a distinction
65. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA),
8 U.S.C. § 1227.
66. See KANSTROOM, supra note 22, at 10, 228–31.
67. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, supra note 62.
68. JOHN F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS: 2013, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. For a helpful overview of the 1996 reforms, see generally David
A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 62–68 (2001) and Nancy Morawetz, Understanding
the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000).
69. SIMANSKI, supra note 68, at 1. Congress’s “radical expansion of the grounds of
deportation,” in combination with “stringent admissions restrictions . . . and lax border
enforcement policy by the Executive,” has had the “counterintuitive consequence of delegating
tremendous authority to the President to set immigration screening policy by making a huge
fraction of noncitizens deportable at the option of the Executive.” Adam B. Cox & Christina M.
Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 463 (2009).
70. Memorandum from John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All ICE Employees (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/
2011/110302washingtondc.pdf.
71. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (July 17,
2015), http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals.
72. See Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, supra note 62.
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between a discrete class of immigration laws that govern the rights of
noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States, and the host of
other state and federal laws that subject noncitizens to various burdens
and disabilities but do not purport to regulate immigration per se. This
Section argues that the immigration/alienage distinction is analytically
incoherent; and further, that courts often approach those categories
instrumentally, by classifying state and federal rules alternatively as
either “immigration” or “alienage” laws as a means of calibrating
constitutional skepticism.
Immigration laws are generally classified as such because they
define the rights of noncitizens to enter and remain within the United
States, and thus operate as what Professor Adam B. Cox helpfully labels
“selection rules.”73 Immigrant selection encompasses, most obviously,
rules defining which noncitizens are eligible for admission to the United
States, as well as rules governing the removal (or de-selection) of
noncitizens already present in U.S. territory.74 Selection rules are
understood to be analytically and legally distinct from the vast array of
state and federal laws that directly and indirectly regulate the status and
conduct of noncitizens, but which do not purport to govern immigration
per se.75 The concepts rest on “a rough sense that selection has to do
with the process of sorting, while regulation has to do with the process
of determining how immigrants residing in the United States live their
lives.”76 Because the selection of noncitizens is understood to implicate
national sovereignty and foreign affairs in ways that the regulation of
resident noncitizens does not, the Court affords the federal government
very broad authority to adopt and enforce selection rules, while
restraining local, state and (to a lesser extent) federal regulation of
resident noncitizens.77
Although the notion of a logically and legally discrete category of
immigration laws is attractive in its apparent analytical clarity, it
seriously mischaracterizes the manner in which immigration-related
lawmaking and enforcement actually governs the migration of
noncitizens to and from the United States. As Professor Cox explains,
“Every rule that imposes duties on noncitizens imposes both selection
pressure, potentially influencing noncitizens’ decisions about whether to
enter or depart the United States, and regulatory pressure, potentially

73. Cox, supra note 36, at 344–45.
74. Id. at 342–43.
75. See id. at 343–45.
76. Id. at 345.
77. See Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (striking down a federal Civil Service
Commission regulation barring noncitizens from employment in the competitive civil service).
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influencing the way in which resident noncitizens live.”78 Consider the
various statutory provisions that govern noncitizens’ eligibility to
immigrate to the United States, such as rules concerning family
connections,79 employment qualifications,80 and numerical quotas;81 as
well as conditions on noncitizens’ continued residence in the United
States, such as refraining from certain criminal conduct.82 As selection
rules, these are archetypal immigration laws insofar as they define who
is eligible to enter and remain within the United States. But as Professor
Cox observes, such rules also necessarily “operate as immigrantregulating rules by generating powerful incentives for immigrants to
live their lives in particular ways.”83 Most obviously, the prospect of
removal from the United States “creates pressure for a resident
noncitizen to avoid committing crimes classified as aggravated
felonies.”84 Similarly, federal statutory provisions making unauthorized
entry grounds for removal will inform the choices of unauthorized
entrants about where to live and work, as well as whether to engage in
conduct that risks an encounter with government officials, such as
driving or registering one’s children for school.85
Just as selection rules create substantial regulatory pressure,
“putative immigrant-regulating rules create substantial selection
pressure.”86 Consider the recent spate of state and local laws restricting
housing and employment opportunities for some noncitizens; requiring
that noncitizens carry special registration documents; restricting
eligibility for certain public benefits; and prohibiting noncitizen voting
and office-holding.87 These are classic alienage regulations in the sense
that they burden noncitizens by virtue of their lack of citizenship but do
not formally govern anyone’s right to enter or remain within a
jurisdiction. Yet such regulations will powerfully shape noncitizens’
78. Cox, supra note 36, at 343. Professor Cox is not the first to point to the difficulty in
drawing a clean distinction between immigration and alienage laws. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak,
Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1063–
68 (1994); Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2451–52 (2007);
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L
L. 201, 203 (1994) [hereinafter Motomura, Immigration and Alienage].
79. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (2012).
80. See id. § 1153(b).
81. See id. § 1152.
82. See id. § 1227(a)(2).
83. Cox, supra note 36, at 361.
84. Id.
85. As Professor Cox observes, the “regulation effects of immigration rules” are not
limited to noncitizens already present in the United States, as conditions for admission may
shape “potential migrants’ decisions about education, marriage, and [employment].” Id. at 363.
86. Id. at 364.
87. For a fuller discussion of such laws, see infra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.
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migration decisions—whether to migrate to the United States in the first
place, where to settle if one does decide to migrate, and whether to
remain in the United States or in a particular state if one has migrated
already.88
The creation of selection pressure is the natural, and often intended,
effect of such regulations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that
state
discrimination
against
noncitizens
“necessarily
operate[s] . . . to discourage entry into or continued residency in the
State.”89 To deny an alien “the necessities of life, including food,
clothing and shelter . . . equate[s] [to] the assertion of a right,
inconsistent with federal policy, to deny entrance and abode.”90 Viewed
in this light, “such laws encroach upon exclusive federal power, [and]
are constitutionally impermissible.”91 The categorical distinction
between immigration and alienage laws—or, in Professor Cox’s
terminology, between immigrant-selecting rules and immigrantregulating rules—is further complicated by the federal government’s
long-standing and very deliberate practice of selectively underenforcing federal immigration law—a practice that has prompted many
states and localities to enter into the immigration arena.92
In short, that neat division between a select class of immigration
laws and the various non-immigration laws that nevertheless directly
and palpably shape the migration decisions of noncitizens, does not
reflect how law actually functions to govern immigrants and
immigration. Moreover, even if it were possible to draw an analytically
defensible dividing line, it is unclear why that line would carry any legal
significance.
If the distinction between immigration and alienage regulation is so
illusory, however, why does it continue to operate as a central premise
of the federal immigration power? Most obviously, the notion of a
88. See generally Martin, supra note 68, at 18 (“Changes to the treatment or opportunity
of noncitizens in the United States, whether in the direction of restriction or liberalization,
almost inevitably affect the decisions of people and organizations abroad who are thinking about
organizing or participating in migration to the United States.”).
89. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 379 (1971).
90. Id. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Id.
92. As Hiroshi Motomura explains, by making “both lawful admissions and
enforcement . . . highly selective,” the federal government has, in effect, invited mass
“immigration outside the law,” primarily in order to satisfy domestic labor demands. HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE Law 22 (2014). Under this self-conscious “scheme of
tolerance,” Motomura argues, “the actual operation of law in action . . . amount[s] to
government policy,” even if that policy “seems inconsistent with what is explicitly written in
statutes and regulations.” Id. at 107, 109. Many states and localities, in turn, have interpreted
that unspoken federal “policy” as a vacuum of federal enforcement, and sought to fill that
vacuum with their own immigration measures. See id. at ch. 2.
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discrete body of laws defining who will be included with the American
polity helps to underwrite the inherent sovereignty rationale for
immigration exceptionalism. Insofar as formal legal conditions for
admission and removal govern access to U.S. territory, the U.S. labor
market, and potentially U.S. citizenship, they appear to implicate
national sovereignty with an immediacy that mere alienage regulations
do not.
More subtly, however, the distinction between immigration and
alienage regulations also endows courts with remarkable flexibility in
how they adjudicate challenges to laws that impose distinctive burdens
or disabilities on noncitizens. Because the fiction of a discrete category
of immigration laws radically understates the range of legal techniques
through which lawmakers and other officials govern immigration—and
which could therefore plausibly be characterized as immigration laws—
it falls upon courts to classify a challenged law as either a regulation of
immigration per se or something else. This classification function, in
turn, affords courts significant discretion in how they position various
state and federal laws in relation to a given constitutional challenge.
Consider Mathews v. Diaz, discussed in the opening paragraphs of this
Article.93 The Court simply assumed without discussion that the
challenged provision—a federal statute establishing a five-year
residency requirement for receiving Medicaid—constituted an
immigration law.94 That assumption consigned the matter to the
“political branches,”95 and thus limited the Court’s role in reviewing the
constitutionality of a federal rule that had no obvious bearing on any
immigrant’s right to enter or remain within the United States and that
lacked a substantial connection to foreign affairs, national security, or
any other typical concomitant of U.S. sovereignty. In short, the Court’s
unstated classification foreclosed meaningful scrutiny of the noncitizen
plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.
Five years earlier, when the Court struck down a similar state
residency requirement in Graham v. Richardson,96 one might have
expected it to be on federal preemption grounds. After all, if the Court
had classified the statute as an immigration law, as it did the analogous
federal provision in Diaz, it would have been structurally preempted
under the Supremacy Clause for having treaded into an exclusively
federal regulatory domain.97 Yet the Court did not stake its holding to
the classification of the residency requirement as an immigration law.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
Id.
403 U.S. at 382–83.
See Waxman & Morrison, supra note 32, at 2217–18.
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Instead, it invalidated the provision as an unconstitutional denial of
equal protection.98 Because “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a
‘discrete and insular’ minority,” the Graham Court reasoned,
“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”99
The slippage between the ostensibly discrete categories of
immigration and alienage law afforded the Court considerable
flexibility. Specifically, by approaching the provision in Graham
primarily as an ordinary state welfare law, and only “additional[ly]” as a
regulation of immigration, the majority elected to adjudicate the equal
protection claim, and thus to pass constitutional judgment on what the
justices viewed as an invidious classification.100 But in Diaz,
approaching the analogous federal statute as an immigration law
enabled the Court to defer to the political judgment of Congress without
having to explain why the challenged alienage classification did not
offend a core constitutional commitment to equal treatment.
Nowhere is the judicial utility of this classification function more
evident than in federal preemption challenges to the recent flood of state
and local laws regulating noncitizens.101 Most prominently, in United
98. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.
99. Id. (footnotes omitted). Even before the Supreme Court adopted the now-familiar
framework of applying heightened scrutiny to so-called “suspect classifications,” it struck down
various state laws as a denial of equal protection. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n,
334 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1948) (striking down on equal protection grounds a state law restricting
issuance of fishing licenses to noncitizens); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (striking
down on equal protection grounds a state law requiring a minimum percentage of employees to
be U.S. citizens).
100. See 403 U.S. at 376–77.
101. The new “immigration federalism” has given rise to a large scholarly literature
representing a broad spectrum of assessments. See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 92, at ch. 2
(analyzing the broad array of state and local laws adopted in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as
their influence on federal policy); Erin F. Delaney, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a
Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821,
1855–56 (2007) (proposing the application of dormant Commerce Clause analysis to state laws
regulating aliens as a way to overcome the limitations of conventional federal preemption
doctrine and relative immunity to constitutional review of state laws enacted under an authority
devolved from Congress); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 (2008) (arguing that immigration is akin to “areas of
constitutional law that involve a mix of federal and state authority” and rejecting the view that
any state immigration regulation is structurally preempted); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and
Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012)
(observing that the federal courts’ application of conventional preemption analysis to state and
local efforts to regulate immigration often obscures important civil rights implications, including
possible racial profiling); Motomura, Federalism, supra note 22, at 1392–94 (arguing in favor of
retaining a discrete form of “immigration exceptionalism” with respect to federal exclusivity);
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L.
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States v. Arizona, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of Arizona
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070), which required aliens to carry registration
documents, authorized the arrest of any person suspected of being an
undocumented alien, and made it illegal for an undocumented alien to
hold or seek employment.102 Laws such as Arizona’s bear many of the
indices of immigration laws. Their often-express purpose is to deter
undocumented migrants from entering the state and to induce those
already present to leave. Indeed, the Arizona legislature’s
“declare[d] . . . intent” in adopting SB 1070 was “to make attrition
through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government
agencies in Arizona.”103 As the sponsor of a similar 2011 Alabama law
REV. 567, 571 (2008) (arguing that “immigration regulation should be included in the list of
quintessentially state interests, such as education, crime control, and the regulation of health,
safety, and welfare, not just because immigration affects each of those interests, but also
because managing immigrant movement is itself a state interest”); Peter H. Schuck, Taking
Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 59 (2007) (arguing for “a more
robust role for the states in certain areas of immigration policy,” as long as “they reflect a
legitimate state interest and do not interfere with the goals of federal immigration policy”); Peter
J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1628–39
(1997) (proposing that immigration federalism may serve a “steam-valve” function in which the
opportunity for anti-alien states to effectuate their political preferences, albeit in a limited way,
could dampen the political impetus for federal anti-alien measures); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of
Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1565
(2008) (predicting that the “domestication of immigration law” by states and localities
concerned with economic and criminal issues is “bound to expand judicial acceptance of state
and local participation in immigration control”); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local
Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2008) (arguing that the immigration
federalism “crisis” identified by critics of subnational regulation is less “a response to
immigration or a consequence of existing federal immigration policy” than a “more familiar
byproduct of . . . how we structure and organize local communities . . . , provide and allocate
local services, and define the legal relationship of local, state and federal governments”);
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 497 (2001) (arguing that the 1996 Welfare
Act’s devolution to the states of the authority to deny benefits on the basis of alienage amounted
to an “invitation to discriminate”).
102. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503–05 (2012). Five more states—Alabama, Georgia, Indiana,
South Carolina, and Utah—soon followed Arizona’s lead, adopting bills modeled after S.B.
1070. Like the Arizona statutes, these laws “require law enforcement to attempt to determine the
immigration status of a person involved in a lawful stop; allow state residents to sue . . . for
noncompliance with immigration enforcement; require E-Verify . . . ; prohibit the harboring . . .
of unauthorized aliens; and make it a violation for failure to carry an alien registration
document.” Brooke Meyer et al., Immigration Policy Report: 2011 Immigration-Related Laws
and Resolutions in the States (Jan.1–Dec. 7, 2011), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
immigration/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2016).
103. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010 Ariz. Sess.
Laws 450 (codified as amended in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. tits. 11, 13, 23,
28, and 41). Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
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explained, the theory of “attrition through enforcement,” or “selfdeportation,” is that by “‘attack[ing] every aspect of an illegal
immigrant’s life,’” states and localities can “‘make it difficult for them
to live here so they will deport themselves.’”104 In fact, attrition through
enforcement is a well-theorized strategy promoted aggressively over the
previous decade by immigration restriction organizations and legal
activists.105
If laws such as Arizona’s were classified as immigration laws, they
would be structurally preempted for having interfered in an exclusively
federal regulatory arena.106 Indeed, the logical argument for treating
them as immigration laws seems quite compelling. In light of the
Arizona legislature’s declared purpose of “attrition through
enforcement,” Judge John Noonan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit observed, “Without qualification, Arizona establishes its
policy on immigration.”107 But Judge Noonan stands alone in that
104. Caught in the Net: Alabama’s Immigration Law Is Proving Too Strict and Too Costly,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21543541 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Alabama law additionally required public schools to verify students’
immigration status. Id.
105. On the career of “attrition through enforcement,” see MICHELE WASLIN, IMMIGRATION
POL’Y CTR., DISCREDITING “SELF-DEPORTATION” AS IMMIGRATION POLICY 2–4 (2012),
http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Waslin_-_Attrition_Through_Enforcement_
020612.pdf. In particular, Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach has been a legal and
intellectual leader of the movement for attrition through enforcement. Id. at 4–5. Secretary
Kobach, a former immigration official in the George W. Bush administration, coauthored the
Arizona and Alabama immigration statutes, has published academic articles advocating for an
expanded role for states and localities in combating unauthorized immigration, and as an
attorney defended various state and local provisions against constitutional attack. Id.; see also
e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181–82 (2006).
106. In federal preemption challenges, the U.S. government routinely characterizes state
laws regulating noncitizens as “immigration laws,” even if its substantive arguments center on
field or conflict preemption. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d
980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (2:10-cv-01413-NVM) (characterizing the challenged Arizona laws as “a
sweeping set of provisions that are designed to ‘work together to discourage and deter the
unlawful entry and presence of aliens’ by making ‘attrition through enforcement the public
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona,’” and arguing that a state “may not
establish its own immigration policy”); Complaint at 2, United States v. Alabama, 2:11-cv02746-WMA (N.D. Ala. filed Aug. 1, 2011) (characterizing the challenged Alabama law as “a
sweeping set of provisions that are designed to address numerous aspects of immigration
regulation and enforcement,” and arguing that a state “may not establish its own immigration
policy”).
107. Judge Noonan wrote:
That immigration policy is a subset of foreign policy follows from its subject:
the admission, regulation and control of foreigners within the United States. By
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conclusion among federal judges. Courts have uniformly declined to
review laws such as Arizona’s as immigration laws, even while
recognizing that they are motivated, at least in part, by legislatures’
desire to effect noncitizens’ migration and settlement decisions. In
Arizona v. United States, for example, the Court cited the state’s
declared policy of “attrition through enforcement” and readily
acknowledged that the express purpose of SB 1070 was to exert
selection pressure on undocumented noncitizens who were either
already present in or considering migrating to the state.108 To uphold the
provision authorizing state officers to make a warrantless arrest of any
person the officer has “probable cause” to believe has committed a
removable offense, the Court declared, “would allow the State to
achieve its own immigration policy.”109 The Court nevertheless declined
to analyze SB 1070 as an immigration law per se, opting instead to
strike down three different sections of SB 1070 on field and conflict
preemption grounds.110
its subject, immigration policy determines the domestication of aliens as
American citizens. It affects the nation’s interactions with foreign populations
and foreign nations[,] . . . the travel of foreigners here and the trade conducted
by foreigners here.
Id. While this Article disagrees with Judge Noonan’s position that any regulation that bears in a
substantial way on the inclusion of foreigners within the American polity should ineluctably be
declared a matter of foreign affairs or national security, his concurring opinion helpfully
illustrates how characterizing immigration regulation as a subset of foreign affairs and national
security leads logically to the structural preemption of any subnational law that exerts
substantial pressure on foreign migration to or from the United States.
108. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012).
109. Id. at 2506.
110. Id. at 2501–03. The Court held that Section 3, which created a new state misdemeanor
punishing “the ‘willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document,’” was
preempted because Congress had occupied the field of alien registration. Id. at 2501 (quoting
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1509(A) (2011)). The Court held that Section 5(C), “maki[ng] it a
state misdemeanor for ‘an unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a
public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor,’” and Section 6,
“provid[ing] that a state officer, ‘without a warrant, may arrest a person if the officer has
probable cause to believe . . . [the person] has committed any public offense that makes [him]
removable from the United States,’” were preempted on the ground that they posed an “obstacle
to the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Id. at 2503–05 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-2928(C), 13-3883(A)(5)).
To observe that the Court characterized Arizona as an ordinary Supremacy Clause case
rather than a plenary power case, however, does not mean that the values and concerns that
underlie the plenary power doctrine—namely foreign affairs and national sovereignty—had no
bearing on the Court’s analysis. As Professor Kerry Abrams explains, the Arizona Court offers a
lengthy “paean to federal power . . . [that] serves as a kind of rhetorical ‘penumbra,’ radiating
out over the preemption analysis.” Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV.
601, 603 (2013). By unfolding its preemption analysis in the shadow of plenary federal power,
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The intention here is not to criticize the Court for analyzing the
challenged Arizona provisions as something other than immigration
laws. The broader contention of this Article, after all, is that the very
notion of a singular category of immigration law is analytically
incoherent and should be retired. Rather, this analysis highlights that
when courts decline to approach state laws restricting certain
noncitizens’ access to employment or requiring noncitizens to carry
registration documents as something other than immigration
regulations, they are making an interpretive choice. Consider the
contrast between Arizona and Diaz. In Diaz, the Court assumed without
discussion that a federal law defining Medicare eligibility was an
immigration law,111 a classification decision that enabled the Court to
uphold the statute out of deference to Congress without having to
explain why the challenged alienage classification was consistent with
equal protection. The Court’s decision in Arizona to approach SB 1070
as something other than an immigration regulation likewise held
considerable instrumental value. Most obviously, by withholding the
immigration law label the Court preserved for individual states a
potentially meaningful role in regulating a class of persons—in
particular, undocumented migrants, as well as noncitizens more
generally—the presence of which directly implicates local and national
concerns.112 Not least, it also reserved for reviewing courts the
flexibility inherent in field and conflict preemption analysis. Rather than
invalidating Arizona’s attrition through enforcement policy in toto, the
Arizona Court could engage in a more granular analysis of the
challenged statute—striking down some provisions as obstacles to a
congressional purpose; upholding another as complementary to, rather
than in conflict with, federal law; and reserving judgment on others
until the state had enforced them.113
II. A BRIEF (COUNTER-)HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM
An aura of naturalness surrounds the plenary power doctrine today,
as though withholding constitutional rights from persons subject to
Professor Abrams suggests, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion could deploy national
sovereignty rhetoric selectively, bolstering its preemption analysis with respect to some of the
challenged provisions while withholding it in others. See id. at 627–33.
111. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
112. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 101, at 791; Rodriguez, supra note 101.
113. For conservative adherents of “new federalism” such as Chief Justice John Roberts,
the author of the majority opinion in Arizona, conflict preemption may be preferable to the blunt
instrument of plenary federal power because it permits the conclusion that Arizona did overstep
its authority without foreclosing a more limited role for the states in regulating noncitizens
within their border.
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federal authority is a self-evident concomitant of exclusive citizenship
and sovereign nationhood. When a noncitizen challenges a federal law
or enforcement action on constitutional grounds, the reviewing court
will take it as given that Congress and the President are owed
extraordinary deference. Each time that the Supreme Court reaffirms the
constitutional exceptionalism of the federal immigration power, it
dutifully recites the presumptive connection between immigration
regulation and the conduct of foreign affairs and national security.114
Even dissenting or concurring Justices who appear to harbor serious
misgivings about such deference often avoid attacking the plenary
power doctrine directly, urging instead that it be applied more flexibly
and humanely.115
This was not always the case. This Part seeks to recover the largely
repressed history of judicial resistance to the plenary power doctrine.
Section II.A considers the history of immigration-related lawmaking
and enforcement in the century before immigration law emerged as a
legal category. It demonstrates that until the final decades of the
nineteenth century, immigration regulation was an unexceptional aspect
of both the state police power and the federal commerce power. Section
II.B describes a counter-history of the inherent sovereignty rationale—a
history of dissent, criticism, and regret on the part of not only scholars
and activists but also many Supreme Court Justices—that defies the
presumption of inevitability that typically characterizes modern
defenses of immigration exceptionalism.
A. Before Constitutional Exceptionalism: Pre-aggregated
Immigration Law
Beyond empowering Congress to “establish a[] uniform Rule of
Naturalization,”116 the U.S. Constitution omits any mention of the
authority to regulate immigration. This virtual silence begs the question:
why would a document that is otherwise so attentive to the allocation of
power, both within the departments of the federal government and
between the federal government and the separate states, neglect to
define this “basic aspect[] of national sovereignty?”117
The answer lies in the fact that at the time of the founding of the
United States and for nearly a century thereafter, American policy
makers and judges did not conceive of immigration per se as a
114. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490–91 (1999).
115. See, e.g., Demore, 538 U.S. at 578–79 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
117. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
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substantively or constitutionally discrete subject of lawmaking, federal
or otherwise. This Section briefly reviews the pre-history of the modern
federal immigration power, in order both to denaturalize the modern
category of “immigration law” and to underscore that the inherent
sovereignty model is not inherent to the regulation of immigration.
Until the 1870s, individual states exercised substantial authority
over immigrants and immigration under their traditional police
powers.118 As the objects of state police regulation—as potential
paupers or carriers of disease, for example—immigrants were simply
persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the
community was, like that of all persons, subject to regulation.119
Even when the Supreme Court transferred authority to govern the
admission of foreign migrants from the states to Congress in the
1870s and 1880s, it characterized federal authority not as an attribute
of national sovereignty but as a variety of international commercial
regulation.120 For the first century of the nation’s history, governing
foreign migrants at the U.S. border and within U.S. territory was thus
constitutionally indistinct from the larger bodies of state and federal
economic regulation in which that governance was embedded. The
decidedly unexceptional manner in which both state and federal law
conceived of noncitizens defies the constitutional singularity of a
distinct class of exclusively federal immigration laws that govern the
admission and removal of foreigners.
It was a full century after the founding generation ordained the
young republic the “asylum of mankind”121 before the federal
government claimed significant authority to govern foreign
immigration.122 Until the 1870s, Congress neither defined the terms of
eligibility for foreigners’ admission into the country nor governed their
manner of entry. Instead, the seaboard states—primarily New York, but
also California, Louisiana, and Massachusetts, among others—
administered the landing of immigrants, and each individual state
determined the rights and privileges of foreigners residing in its
territory.123 It was not that the ebb and flow of foreign immigration was
118. Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 774.
119. See id. at 774–86.
120. Id. at 793.
121. MARILYN C. BASELER, “ASYLUM FOR MANKIND”: AMERICA 1607–1800, at 7 (1998).
122. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (1993). For background on the federalization of immigration
lawmaking, see generally ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN
THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA (2006); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005).
123. See Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal
Government, and the Formation of American Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. HIST. 1092, 1094
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unproblematic. Indeed, notwithstanding the nation’s long-prevailing
policy of encouraging—or at least not restraining—immigration, policy
makers, reformers, judges, and other opinion leaders periodically
worried throughout this period about the influence of foreign arrivals on
the character and well-being of the communities in which they
settled.124 Yet well into the post-Civil War era, there was a broad
consensus that the regulatory challenges and political interests
implicated by the presence of foreigners—the problem of economic
dependency and crime, for example, or the desire to attract laborers or
settlers—were fundamentally local in nature.125 As such, those
problems fit comfortably within the states’ traditional police authority,
through which states and municipalities regulated all aspects of public
safety, health, morals, and welfare throughout the nineteenth century.126
Sectional conflict over slavery likewise weighed heavily in favor of
sub-national immigration law. Pro-slavery states’ rights advocates, in
particular, denied that immigrants were properly understood as “articles
of commerce” precisely because that view implied that Congress might
have the authority to regulate other human articles of commerce,
including slaves.127
From the first decades of the nation’s history, regulating the status of
foreigners present within the territory of a particular state was indistinct
as a matter of legal authority from the task governing the domestic
population. Because neither the Constitutional Convention nor the
subsequent ratification debates addressed the authority to regulate
immigration,128 the clearest glimpse of contemporaneous thought on the
issue comes from debates in Congress over the Alien Friends Act of
1798.129 The Act authorized the President to order the removal of any

(2013); Matthew J. Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic: Political Economy, Race,
and the Federalization of American Immigration Law, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181, 191–202
(2005) [hereinafter Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic].
124. See Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 765–74.
125. See id. at 774–78.
126. On the pervasiveness of police regulations in the nineteenth-century United States, see
generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA (1996).
127. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. On the role of slavery in the unfolding
constitutional debate over immigration regulation, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over
Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 793–
818 (1996).
128. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and
Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 15–18 (1996).
129. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798). It was so designated to distinguish it from the
Alien Enemies Act, which was part of the same package of legislation and applied only to the
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alien that he judged “dangerous to the peace and safety of the United
States, or . . . ha[d] reasonable grounds to suspect” was engaged in
treason or “secret machinations” against the U.S. government.130 It was
a key component of the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, and the most
audacious legislative expression of the anti-alien frenzy stoked by
Federalists in the 1790s.131
Congressional Republicans condemned the Act as a grotesque
assault on the Constitution—“[a] sacrifice of the first-born offspring of
freedom . . . proposed by those who gave it birth”132—that, among other
offenses, threatened to “swallow[] up” at Congress’s pleasure “all the
reserved powers of the people or of the States.”133 State legislatures,
they stressed, had long acted on the presumption that the individual
states had “reserved to themselves the power of regulating what relates
to emigrants.”134 That presumption, moreover, was rooted in the
fundamentally local nature of immigration policy making, which was
heavily informed by the specific demographic and economic
circumstances within each state. Albert Gallatin, a Republican leader in
the House of Representatives and President Thomas Jefferson’s future
Treasury Secretary,135 explained that while “States whose population is
full, and to which few migrations take place, are little concerned” with
the bill’s potential to discourage immigration, it was of great
“consequence . . . to those States whose population is thin, and whose
policy it has always been to encourage emigration.”136 “Not only in
some States have aliens been enabled to purchase, to hold, to inherit,
and to leave by will, real estates,” Representative Gallatin recounted,
“but many have actually been admitted . . . to all the rights of citizens of

subjects of nations with which the United States was at war. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat.
577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)).
130. Ch. 58, 1 Stat. at 571.
131. In a series of bills preceding the Alien and Sedition Acts, Federalists had inflamed the
nation’s nativist mood by admonishing Americans that alien enemies, and particularly French
radicals, had infiltrated the American polity with the intention of devouring the tree of
republican liberty root and branch. See ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801, at 126–30 (1966);
Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3, at 758–63.
132. E.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2015 (1798) (statement of Rep. Robert Livingston).
133. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2996 (1799) (statement of Rep. Albert Gallatin). Republican
opponents of the Act charged that it violated the fundamental tenets of both separation of
powers and federalism. See, e.g., id.
134. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022 (statement of Rep. William Smith).
135. Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
417, 424 (2008).
136. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1982 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
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those States.”137 Perhaps most tellingly, even the Act’s Federalist
advocates generally acknowledged that it granted to the President an
extraordinary measure of authority, and that during more tranquil times
the “power of admitting foreigners . . . remained with the States.”138
In fact, the early states governed aliens in largely the same manner
that they governed citizens. Historian Kunal Parker’s study of the legal
construction of immigrants in antebellum Massachusetts reveals that
well into the nineteenth century, individual towns, rather than the state
or nation, operated as the “salient territorial unit” for the purpose of
poor relief—one of the principal functions of municipal government.139
Because “[o]utsiders were specifically understood as all individuals
lacking a settlement in the town, rather than as individuals lacking
citizenship,” town officials did not distinguish between “foreigners”
who had been born and long resided in a neighboring town or state and
“foreigners” who had immigrated to the United States from Ireland a
month earlier.140 Only several decades after American independence did
citizenship come to inform the administration of the state’s poor laws.
My own earlier study of the New York State Commissioners of
Emigration, the state agency that administered the landing of threequarters of the nation’s immigrants between 1847 and 1891, confirms
that until the 1870s, state immigration regulation was animated by the
quintessentially local law and logic of poor relief and moral uplift.141
Most importantly, the Supreme Court generated a body of
constitutional immigration law premised on the idea that state laws
governing the admission of foreigners to their jurisdictions were but one
aspect of each state’s poor laws, and that immigrants’ noncitizenship
was thus incidental, or at least secondary, to the nature of the regulatory
authority to which they were subject. The early development of
constitutional immigration law centered on two mid-nineteenth-century
137. 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3000 (statement of Rep. Gallatin). Another Republican declared
that “[i]f aliens were to be sent off or banished,” it must therefore “be by the State Governments
where they lived.” 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2003 (statement of Rep. Abraham Baldwin).
138. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1986 (statement of Rep. Harrison Otis). Federalist sponsors of the
Alien Friends Act defended the Act on the basis of Congress’s duty of national self-defense and
repeatedly denied that they were positing anything like a general federal immigration power. See
Lindsay, Constitution of Foreignness, supra note 3 at 758–63.
139. Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of
Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 583, 588–90 (2001).
140. Id. at 588, 597–98.
141. See Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 123, 195–96.
Massachusetts may complicate this general characterization of state policy. Historian Hidetaka
Hirota demonstrates how Massachusetts lawmakers, animated by intense anti-Irish nativism,
aggressively excluded and deported alien paupers in the decades following the period covered
by Parker’s study. See Hirota, supra note 123, at 1103–05.
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cases, Mayor of New York v. Miln142 and the Passenger Cases,143
involving state laws regulating the landing of immigrants. All of the
Justices who participated in those cases agreed that federal authority to
regulate immigration, whatever its extent, derived from Congress’s
commerce power. Disagreement centered on the nature and extent of
authority reserved by the states. Notwithstanding the Justices’ divergent
views over where the boundary between state and federal authority lay,
however, the Court consistently drew the line of demarcation based on
the purpose and effect of the regulation at issue, rather than the
citizenship status of the persons upon whom it operated.144
In Miln, the Court upheld against a federal preemption challenge a
New York state law requiring the master of every vessel arriving in the
port of New York from outside the state to report the name, birthplace,
last legal settlement, age, and occupation of each passenger.145 The
challenger, a shipmaster convicted of violating the Act, argued that
Congress had claimed exclusive authority over all aspects of
immigration when it adopted the Passenger Act of 1819, regulating
steerage conditions on foreign vessels bound for the United States.146
Notably, the five-Justice majority endorsed the state’s police rationale
for a regulatory scheme that today would qualify unambiguously as an
(exclusively federal) immigration law.147 It is particularly revealing in
light of the modern presumption of federal exclusivity that New York
acknowledged that the reporting requirement was intended to regulate
immigration per se, and defended it on that basis. The necessity of
regulating the “constant and steady migration” of Europeans to the
United States had become “obvious” in recent decades, the State
explained.148 Because New York had adopted the reporting requirement
“to prevent the introduction of foreign paupers” into the state, the law
was “a part of the system of poor laws,”149 and thus was a quintessential
police regulation. As such, it could “operate on persons brought into a
state, in the course of commercial operations”150 without making it “a
commercial regulation” in the constitutional sense.151 In support of the
142. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
143. Smith v. Turner & Norris v. City of Bos. (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283
(1849).
144. I elaborate some of the arguments recited here in Lindsay, Constitution of
Foreignness, supra note 3, at 774–86.
145. Miln, 36 U.S. at 102.
146. An Act Regulating Passenger Ships and Vessels, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (1819).
147. Miln, 36 U.S. at 132.
148. Id. at 106.
149. Id. at 110.
150. Id. at 129.
151. Id. at 110.
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proposition that states had engaged in precisely such regulation since
the nation’s founding, New York cited more than one hundred statutes
adopted by a host of different states.152 Notably, virtually none of these
statutes appear to have had anything to do with immigration. 153 Indeed,
that was exactly the point: as far as New York was concerned, the
challenged reporting requirement was merely one among many police
regulations enacted to protect the health and welfare of the State’s
citizenry.
The Court concluded that by virtue of the Act’s purpose and object,
it was “not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and
[thus] . . . passed in the exercise of a power . . . rightfully belong[ing] to
the states.”154 Echoing the State’s brief to the Court, the majority
acknowledged that the statute governed the conditions under which
foreign migrants were landed in the port of New York, but maintained
that this did not impeach its status as a valid police regulation. 155 The
Act was “obviously” intended to protect New Yorkers against the
burden of supporting “multitudes of poor persons . . . from foreign
countries.”156 As an affirmation of the State’s regulatory authority, the
operative phrase here was not “foreign countries” but “poor persons.”
Indeed, the Court stressed the profoundly local nature of the relevant
legislative purposes: “New York from her particular situation, is,
perhaps more than any other city in the Union, exposed to the evil of
thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there.”157 Although the
reporting requirement governed the introduction of foreigners into the
United States, it remained quintessentially a poor law, and as such
belonged to “that immense mass of legislation which embraces
everything within the territory of a state, not surrendered to the general
government,” including inspection, quarantine, and health laws.158
There was thus “no mode in which the power to regulate internal police
could be more appropriately exercised.”159
The very ordinariness of a police regulation directed toward foreign
migrants was underscored by the fact that, while the section of the law
challenged in Miln applied to foreign migrants, the same statute
regulated poor Americans in substantially the same manner, obliging
shipmasters to remove to “the place of his last settlement” any United
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 114–15.
See id. at 113–14.
Id. at 132.
See id. at 131–32, 141.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 141.
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States citizen “deemed likely to become chargeable to the city.”160 In
fact, New York had insisted that denying states the authority to control
the entry of the foreign poor would necessarily deprive them of the
ability to turn away domestic paupers as well.161 It was thus “apparent,”
the Court agreed, that the legislature’s purpose was “to prevent New
York from being burdened by an influx of persons brought thither in
ships, either from foreign countries, or from any other . . . state[].”162 In
short, neither the legislature that adopted the statute nor the Court that
upheld it distinguished between the State’s authority to protect itself
against poor Americans and its authority to protect itself against poor
Europeans. To the extent that the majority “look[ed] at the person on
whom [the law] operates,” it mattered only that “he [was] found within
the same territory and jurisdiction.”163
Moreover, the Court insisted that there was nothing constitutionally
distinctive about a statute that regulated foreigners engaged in the
process of immigration. The majority likened the regulation of foreign
migrants under the challenged poor law to the prosecution under New
York criminal law of recently landed “officers, seamen and passengers,
who are within its jurisdiction.”164 Just as “[t]he right to punish, or to
prevent crime, does in no degree depend upon the citizenship of the
party who is obnoxious to the law,”165 the Court explained, “the same
reasons, precisely, equally subject [a shipmaster] . . . to liability for
failure to comply with” the reporting requirement.166 Each law
depended upon the “same principle”—that New York, by virtue of its
traditional police authority, could regulate “the persons and things
within her territorial limits.”167 Neither an immigrant’s foreignness nor
his migration from abroad entered into the analysis.
Over the next half-century, even as the Supreme Court edged closer
to federal exclusivity, the Justices continued to understand the
regulation of foreign migration as a fairly unremarkable instance of the
state police or federal commerce power. The Court’s next attempt to
demarcate the states’ and Congress’s respective spheres of authority
came twelve years after Miln in the Passenger Cases. A five-Justice

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 154 (Story, J., dissenting).
Id. at 102 (majority opinion).
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
Id.
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majority168 struck down similar New York and Massachusetts laws
requiring the master of every vessel arriving from a foreign port to pay a
small tax for each passenger—levied to fund a marine hospital and to
support “foreign paupers,” respectively—on the ground that the laws
unconstitutionally encroached upon the exclusively federal domain of
“commerce with foreign nations.”169 As the majority refigured
immigrants as articles of commerce with foreign nations,170 however, it
staked congressional authority to the commercial nature of immigration
rather than immigrants’ noncitizenship or the fact of their migration
from abroad. Several of the Justices in the majority insisted that so long
as the commercial goods at issue were transported across state lines, the
Commerce Clause was indifferent to the national origin of either the
goods themselves or the persons engaged in their transportation.171
States were prohibited equally from taxing merchandise “from one State
to another State or [from] foreign countries,” irrespective of whether the
importers “are citizens or foreigners.”172 Accordingly, the majority
presumed that a holding with respect to foreign commerce would apply
symmetrically to domestic interstate commerce.173 If New York could
lay a tax on passengers arriving from Europe, Justice John McLean
warned, “every State [could] tax all persons who shall pass through its
territory on railroad-cars, canal-boats, stages, or in any other
manner.”174 The consequence would be to “enable a State to establish
and enforce a non-intercourse with every other State.”175
168. The majority was highly fractured, with each of the five Justices writing separately.
The four Justices in the minority issued three separate dissents, for a total of eight opinions
consisting of nearly 300 pages.
169. Smith v. Turner & Norris v. City of Bos. (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,
286, 400 (1849).
170. The Court had laid the foundation for that construction twenty-five years earlier in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). There, Chief Justice John Marshall famously
concluded that “commerce” encompassed not only “buying and selling, or the interchange of
commodities,” but also “commercial intercourse” more broadly. That included “navigation,”
regardless of whether things transported were goods or passengers. Id. at 189–90.
171. See, e.g., Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 417 (Wayne, J., concurring).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 407 (majority opinion).
174. Id.
175. Id. The dissenters shared the majority’s presumption that the Commerce Clause
applied symmetrically to commerce with foreign nations and commerce among the several
states. See id. at 473 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Indeed, the dissenters resisted the view that
immigrants could be the subjects of commerce at least in part because it implied that Congress
could regulate the movement of other human articles of commerce that increasingly dominated
the nation’s political consciousness—namely, slaves and free blacks. Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney, who eight years later wrote the majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393 (1857), warned that if the federal government could oblige states to receive
immigrants, then “emancipated slaves of the West Indies have at this hour the absolute right to
reside, hire houses, and traffic and trade throughout the Southern States, in spite of any State
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Even after the Passenger Cases, however, the states retained
significant authority to regulate immigration under their police powers
so long as the state laws did not “collide” with the policy of Congress. It
was only in the 1870s and 1880s that the regulation of immigration
became fully and exclusively federal. Beginning in 1875, Congress
adopted a series of statutes transferring immigration policy making and
administrative control from the states to the federal government.176 The
Supreme Court, in turn, struck down several existing state regulations
and upheld the new federal legislation.177 In Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, a unanimous Court acknowledged that European
immigration to the United States “has become part of our commerce
with foreign nations, of vast interest to this country, as well as to the
immigrants who come among us to find a welcome and a home.”178
Recast as “the business of bringing foreigners to [the United States],”179
as the Court later characterized it, immigration qua immigration became
a branch of commerce with foreign nations and thus the exclusive
province of Congress.
The Henderson Court also suggested, for the first time, that
governing foreign migration was conceptually distinct from domestic
commercial regulation. Because a law that impedes immigration
law to the contrary; inevitably producing the most serious discontent, and ultimately leading to
the most painful consequences.” Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 474. On the role of sectional
conflict over slavery in the development of constitutional immigration law, see generally Mary
Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of
Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743 (1996).
176. See Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (prohibiting the
immigration of prostitutes, contract laborers, and convicts from “China, Japan, or any Oriental
country”); Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1551–1574 (2012)) (transferring authority over the landing of immigrants from individual
states to the U.S. Treasury Department); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58
(repealed 1943) (prohibiting the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States for a period of
ten years); Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (repealed 1952) (prohibiting the
immigration of any foreigner who had entered into an employment contract with an American
employer prior to departing his country of origin); Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26
Stat. 1084 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1551–1574) (transferring sole authority to
administer immigration regulations to the federal government and creating the Office of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization under the authority of the Secretary of the
Treasury).
177. See Edye v. Robertson & Cunard Steamship Co. v. Same & Same v. Same, (Head
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 599–600 (1884) (upholding the head tax provision of the federal
Immigration Act of 1882); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (striking
down state head taxes); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1875) (striking down a
California statute empowering a state immigration commissioner to require a bond for
immigrant women determined to be “lewd and debauched”).
178. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270.
179. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595.
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“concern[s] the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations
and governments,” the Court declared, it “may properly be called
international.”180 Federal exclusivity would thus enable the United
States to act as a single, unified sovereign in relation to foreign
governments.181
Yet another decade and a half passed before the Court announced in
the Chinese Exclusion Case182 that federal exclusivity rested on a
plenary, constitutionally exceptional power. Justice Stephen Field’s
opinion for a unanimous Court not only upheld the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882; it also remade Congress’s authority to regulate
immigration from an unremarkable instance of the commerce power to
an extra-constitutional cousin of the war power that was inherent in the
nation’s sovereignty, essential to its self-preservation, and therefore
“conclusive upon the judiciary.”183 Although this re-grounding of
federal authority marked a radical break with historical practice,184 the
Court strove to characterize its innovation as a natural concomitant of
sovereign nationhood that was rooted in timeless principles of

180. Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273.
181. Even after Congress assumed ultimate responsibility for the regulation of immigration
in the Immigration Act of 1882, state officials continued to administer the actual landing of
noncitizens in the United States for another decade under a provision of the 1882 Act that
empowered the Secretary of the Treasury—the Executive department charged with the
administration of the Act—to enter into contractual agreements with state immigration
commissions “to examine into the condition of passengers arriving at the ports.” Immigration
Act of 1882, § 2, 22 Stat. at 214; see also Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra
note 123, at 217 (describing the Immigration Act of 1882). During this period, Massachusetts
officials continued to deport noncitizens deemed foreign paupers pursuant to state policy. See
Hirota, supra note 123, at 1104–05.
182. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
183. Id. at 606. The Court wrote: “To preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these
ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated.” Id. The Court’s construction of
national sovereignty and security were heavily inflected with the theme of racial degradation:
If, therefore, the government of the United States . . . consider[ed] the presence
of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us,
to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed
because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the
foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the
necessity . . . only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity . . . may
arise when war does not exist . . . .
Id. at 606. For a discussion on the role that fears of a racial degradation of American labor and
citizenship played in the origin of the plenary power doctrine, see generally Lindsay,
Immigration as Invasion, supra note 3.
184. See infra Part III.
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international law. In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,185 decided less
than three years later, the Court confirmed that its novel, extraconstitutional federal immigration power extended beyond the
exigencies of Chinese exclusion to the nation’s general immigration
laws. In holding that the decision of a federal immigration inspector
denying admission to a noncitizen was not reviewable in federal
court,186 the Court set out the formulation of the plenary power doctrine
that would become a key rhetorical touchstone for subsequent
immigration cases:
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the
national government, to which the Constitution has
committed the entire control of international relations, in
peace as well as in war.187
The Court reasoned that, as a question of national sovereignty, the
decision to deny admission to would-be immigrants had been consigned
exclusively to the “political department” of the federal government. 188 It
therefore lay beyond “the province of the judiciary” to declare that
foreigners who had never resided in the United States “shall be
permitted to enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful
measures of the legislative and executive branches.”189 At least with
respect to nonresident foreigners, the Court concluded that “the
decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within powers
expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.”190
185. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
186. Federal immigration officials had denied entry to Nishimura Ekiu, a Japanese woman,
under a provision of the Immigration Act of 1891 that excluded “persons likely to become a
public charge” from the United States. Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 16 Stat. 1084;
Nishimura, 142 U.S. at 653. The 1891 Act had further assigned exclusive authority to administer
the immigration laws, including the inspection of immigrants, to a national Superintendent of
immigration lodged within the U.S. Treasury Department, and made final the decisions of
federal inspection officers “touching the right of any alien to land,” subject to review only by
the Superintendent and Treasury Secretary. Immigration Act of 1891, §§ 7–8, 16 Stat. at 1085.
187. Nishimura, 142 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 660.
190. Id. A decade later, the Court did create a narrow opening for procedural review when
it indicated that administrative officers could not “disregard the fundamental principles that
inhere in ‘due process of law.’” Yamataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86,
100 (1903). Although noncitizens’ procedural challenges virtually always failed, the Japanese
Immigrant Case did establish a formal doctrinal foothold for procedural due process claims that
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One year after Nishimura Ekiu, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,191
the Court extended this principle to the expulsion of resident aliens. At
issue was a provision of the Geary Act of 1892 that authorized the arrest
and deportation of any Chinese laborer legally present within the United
States who failed either to obtain a special “certificate of residence” or
produce a “credible white witness” to attest that the laborer had resided
in the United States prior to the adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act
in 1882.192 A six-Justice majority upheld the certificate requirement.
“The right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens,
absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, [was] an
inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent
nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare,”193 the
Court declared. Accordingly, constitutional criminal rights such as due
process, “the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no
application.”194 Fong Yue Ting remains good law, and the Supreme
Court continues to cite the case in support of Congress’s plenary power
to regulate immigration.195
In sum, the notion that foreign immigration per se comprised a
legally discrete, constitutionally exceptional subject of federal
lawmaking did not preexist the adoption of the plenary power doctrine
in the late nineteenth century. The legal category “immigration law”
was an historical effect of, or adjunct to, the Supreme Court’s regrounding of immigration regulation in the nation’s inherent
sovereignty. When contemplating a transition away from a unitary,
categorical, extra-constitutional immigration power and toward a
disaggregated, more context-sensitive model of regulatory authority,196
subsequently afforded meaningful, if still highly deferential, judicial review. See Motomura,
Curious Evolution, supra note 22, at 1652 (describing a due process revolution in immigration
law that culminated with the Court’s 1982 decision in Landon v. Plasencia, holding that a
returning alien was entitled to due process in her exclusion hearing).
191. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
192. Id. at 727. The “credible white witness” alternative to the certificate of residence was
introduced in a rule issued by the Treasury Secretary, who was charged with enforcing the
certificate requirement. See id. at 727–28.
193. Id. at 711.
194. Id. at 730. The Court has continued to insist on the essentially “civil” nature of
deportation proceedings. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)
(“Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context
of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently
classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”).
195. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2514 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 705).
196. See infra Part III.
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it is helpful to recall that the inherent sovereignty model is not inherent
to the regulation of immigration. Rather, a century of pre-aggregated
immigration law provides abundant legal and historical precedent.
B. Judicial Dissent from the “Inherent Sovereignty” Model
Virtually from the moment of its adoption at the end of the
nineteenth century, the plenary power doctrine has been the object of
dissent, criticism, and regret on the part of not only scholars and
activists but also many Supreme Court Justices. This Section surveys
this counter-history of judicial protest against, and ultimately
resignation toward, a federal immigration power that is untethered from
the Constitution. It demonstrates how, at the plenary power doctrine’s
two key constitutive moments—its formative period of the 1890s and its
solidification in the early 1950s—the doctrine remained intensely
controversial. Throughout this period, several of the Justices argued
strenuously in dissents that the consignment of immigration regulation
exclusively to the political departments, buffered against judicially
enforceable constitutional constraints, was fundamentally inconsistent
with constitutional liberty and the rule of law. These dissents have
served as a kind of jurisprudential refuge for the rights of noncitizens,
where full constitutional personhood could be articulated.197
As Part II noted, in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case and subsequent
decisions the Supreme Court reconstructed Congress’s authority to
regulate immigration from an unremarkable instance of the commerce
power to an extra-constitutional analogue to the war power that was
inherent in the nation’s sovereignty, essential to its self-preservation,
and therefore “conclusive upon the judiciary.” The Court characterized
its innovation as a natural concomitant of sovereign nationhood
grounded in timeless principles of international law. Yet the patina of
logical necessity in Justice Field’s unanimous decision dissolved four
years later, in Fong Yue Ting. The extension of the plenary power
doctrine from the exclusion of noncitizens to the expulsion of resident
aliens produced three unusually vigorous dissents. Justice David Brewer
condemned the very notion that legal residents of the United States
could be subject to an extra-constitutional federal authority grounded in
the ill-defined concept of national sovereignty; Justice Field, the author
of the Chinese Exclusion Case, denounced at length the extension of the
inherent-sovereignty model of federal authority from exclusion to
197. In his important study of due process dissents between the Reconstruction Era and the
early twentieth century, jurisprudence scholar Colin Starger demonstrates how “dissents can
keep particular traditions of constitutional interpretation alive [after they are] forced into exile
by shifting majorities of the Court.” Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions
of Due Process Dissent, 95 MARQUETTE L.R. 1253, 1257 (2012).
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deportation; and Chief Justice Melvin Fuller reiterated more briefly the
essence of Justice Field’s position. Justices Field’s and Brewer’s
opinions are worth considering at length for what they reveal about the
novelty and extraordinary constitutional exceptionalism of the emerging
federal immigration power.
When contemplating the aura of naturalness and inevitability that
surrounds the plenary power doctrine today, it is instructive that its
primary architect “utterly dissent[ed]”198 from the doctrine’s application
to noncitizens who were present within the U.S., and condemned “the
decision as a blow against constitutional liberty” that “fill[ed] [him]
with apprehensions.”199 There was “a wide and essential difference,”
Justice Field insisted, between the power to exclude foreigners from the
country and the “power to deport . . . persons lawfully domiciled
therein.”200 “The moment any human being from a country at peace
with us comes within the jurisdiction of the United States,” Justice Field
explained, she “becomes subject to all their laws, is amenable to their
punishment and entitled to their protection.”201 Because the relevant
constitutional protections described in the Bill of Rights applied to
“persons” and those “accused” of crimes, he reasoned, aliens were
entitled to the same protection against “[a]rbitrary and despotic power”
as “native-born citizens.”202
Justice Field’s reliance on the Court’s then-recent decision in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins is revealing.203 In Yick Wo, the Court unanimously struck
down a San Francisco ordinance endowing city inspectors with
unrestrained discretion to grant or deny business permits to certain
commercial laundries—discretion that the City had used systematically
to close down Chinese-owned laundries.204 Observing that the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
were “universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality,” the Court invalidated the ordinance.205 “[S]trangers and
aliens” enjoyed precisely the same rights under the “universal”
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as “every citizen of the United
States.”206 For Justice Field, the same constitutional principles that
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
down on

Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 755 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 754.
Id.
Id. at 755 (discussing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359, 374.
Id. at 369.
Id.; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233–34, 238 (1896) (striking
Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds a federal statute imposing imprisonment at hard
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prevented a state from discriminating against Chinese laundry owners in
Yick Wo also constrained the federal government in its removal of
resident Chinese.207 He declared: “The fundamental rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as individual possessions are
secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the
monuments, showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to
man the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal
laws.”208 Accordingly, aliens enjoyed the very same protection against
“[a]rbitrary and despotic power” as citizens.209 To hold otherwise
“would be to establish a pure, simple, undisguised despotism and
tyranny with respect to foreigners resident in the country by its
consent.”210 The majority decision carried the impossible implication
that “Congress can, at its pleasure, in disregard of the guarantees of the
Constitution, expel at any time the Irish, German, French, and English
who . . . have taken up their residence here on the invitation of the
government.”211
Justice Field emphatically rejected the majority’s conclusion that
deportation was a mere civil remedy rather than criminal punishment,
and that noncitizens threatened with deportation therefore did not enjoy
constitutional criminal rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments.212 He quoted at length from James Madison’s protest
against the Alien Act of 1798:
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he
has been invited as the asylum most auspicious to his
happiness—a country where he may have formed the most
tender connections, where he may have invested his entire
property . . . , where he enjoys, under the laws, a greater
share of the blessings of personal security and personal
liberty than he can elsewhere hope for, if a banishment of
this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of
punishments, it would be difficult to imagine a doom to
which the name can be applied.213
The “punishment” inflicted under the Geary Act, moreover, was
“beyond all reason in its severity” and “out of all proportion to the
labor on aliens determined in a summary administrative proceeding to be in the country
illegally.)
207. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 755 (Field, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 169).
209. Id. at 754.
210. Id. at 755.
211. Id. at 750.
212. See id. at 748–49.
213. Id. at 749 (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555 (2d ed. 1836)).
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alleged offence.”214 “As to its cruelty,” Justice Field admonished,
“nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s
residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family
and business there contracted.”215 Notwithstanding Justice Field’s
protest, however, the conceit that deportation is not “punishment”
remains a key premise of constitutional immigration law.
Justice Brewer, who was appointed to the Court after the Chinese
Exclusion Case was decided and who dissented without opinion in
Nishimura Ekiu, echoed Justice Field’s insistence that deportation was
punishment216 and that noncitizens living within the United States were
entitled to the protection of the Constitution.217 But Justice Brewer also
added a withering condemnation of the very notion of unrestrained,
extra-constitutional authority:
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both
indefinite and dangerous. Where are the limits to such
powers to be found, and by whom are they to be
pronounced? Is it within the legislative capacity to declare
the limits? If so, then the mere assertion of an inherent
power creates it, and despotism exists. May the courts
establish the boundaries? Whence do they obtain the
authority for this? . . . The expulsion of a race may be
within the inherent powers of a despotism. . . . [The
Framers] gave to this government no general power to
banish.218
Justice Brewer’s words should disabuse modern readers of any
notion that the plenary power doctrine is a natural or inevitable
expression of sovereign nationhood or exclusive citizenship. Rather,
even during a period of intense anti-Chinese sentiment and in the
context of a federal registration law meant to control the “obnoxious

214. Id. at 759.
215. Id. (“The laborer may be seized at a distance from his home, his family and his
business, and taken before the judge for his condemnation, without permission to visit his home,
see his family, or complete any unfinished business.”).
216. Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Every one [sic] knows that to be forcibly taken
away from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean
to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.”).
217. Id. at 738. Assuming that the Constitution implies “the power to remove resident
aliens,” Brewer maintained, that power “still . . . can be exercised only in subordination to the
limitations and restrictions imposed by the Constitution.” Id. The Geary Act’s deportation
provision therefore deprives resident aliens of “‘life, liberty, and property without due process
of law.’ . . . It places the liberty of one individual subject to the unrestrained control of another.”
Id. at 739–40 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
218. Id. at 737.
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Chinese”219 already present in U.S. territory, the assertion of an
unrestrained authority inherent in federal sovereignty posed a
conspicuous constitutional anomaly. “[The] arrest and forcible
deportation from the country” of 100,000 people was not “beyond the
reach of the protecting power of the Constitution.”220
Even as the constitutional exceptionalism of the federal immigration
power became ever more firmly entrenched over the first half of the
twentieth century,221 the Fong Yue Ting dissents continued to resonate.
In a series of “national security” cases decided at the height of the Cold
War in the late 1940s and early 1950s, several Justices voiced varying
degrees of discomfort with a federal authority that was virtually
unrestrained by fundamental constitutional guarantees of procedural
fairness and individual rights.
Justices William Douglas and Hugo Black, in particular, maintained
in defiance of the plenary power doctrine that a resident alien threatened
with deportation had a right to challenge the substantive basis of his
deportation order.222 In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, for example, the
Court upheld the deportation of a noncitizen—a legal U.S. resident for
nearly four decades—on the ground that he had been a member of the
Communist Party years earlier, before such membership was grounds
for deportation.223 The majority conceded that the perpetual
vulnerability of long-term resident noncitizens to “expulsion” from the
United States “bristle[d] with severities” and that the statute under
which Harisiades had been ordered deported—the Alien Registration
Act of 1940—“[stood] out as an extreme application of the expulsion
power.”224 Nevertheless, the power to expel a noncitizen remained “a
weapon of defense and reprisal . . . inherent in every sovereign state,”225
that was “so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of
government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or

219. Id. at 743.
220. Id. at 744.
221. See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 543 (1950); Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 343 (1909).
222. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 581–82, 595–96 (majority opinion). The U.S. Attorney General ordered that the
petitioner, Harisiades, be deported based on a provision of the Alien Registration Act of 1940
authorizing the deportation of a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist
Party. Id.; see Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §2385 (2012)).
224. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587–88.
225. Id. The warrant for such extraordinary federal authority, the majority continued, lay in
the fact that “any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government.” Id. at 588–89.

2016]

DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW”

223

interference.”226
Justices Douglas and Black dissented, insisting that the citizenshipneutral language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and other
provisions in the Bill of Rights entitled noncitizens to both procedural
and substantive constitutional protection.227 Because a noncitizen “who
is assimilated in our society” is a “person” within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause, Justice Douglas explained, he must be “treated as a
citizen so far as his property and liberty are concerned.”228 Justice
Douglas then quoted at length Justice Brewer’s dissent in Fong Yue
Ting condemning the “powers inherent in sovereignty” theory of
immigration regulation—a critique, he wrote, which “grows in power
with the passing years.”229 The majority’s invocation of national
security as a warrant for judicial diffidence was misplaced when the
challenged federal action interfered with a fundamental constitutional
liberty interest.230 “The right to be immune from arbitrary decrees of
banishment certainly may be more important to ‘liberty’ than the civil
rights which all aliens enjoy when they reside here,” Justice Douglas
wrote.231 “Banishment is punishment in the practical sense,” he
explained, and “may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life
worth while.”232 As a result, unless noncitizens “are free from arbitrary
banishment, the ‘liberty’ they enjoy while they live here is indeed
illusory.”233 In stark contrast to the majority’s position, the fact that the
Act governed the noncitizen petitioner’s right to be present in the
United States did not exempt it from judicial review; to the contrary, the
enormous stakes of a deportation proceeding enhanced the importance
of judicially enforceable constitutional constraints.234
Other Justices appear to have acquiesced only reluctantly in the
principle of plenary federal power. Justice Frankfurter’s majority
opinion in Galvan v. Press,235 for example, reveals his serious
226. Id. at 589.
227. See id. at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 598–99.
229. Id. at 599–600.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 600.
232. Id.
233. Id. Although the “drastic step” of banishment “may at times be necessary in order to
protect the national interest,” Justice Douglas continued, unless the Government can show that
“the continued presence of an alien . . . would be hostile to the safety or welfare of the
Nation . . . , I would stay the hand of the Government and let those to whom we have extended
our hospitality and who have become members of our communities remain here and enjoy the
life and liberty which the Constitution guarantees.” Id. at 601.
234. See id. at 598; see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J.
dissenting); id. at 533–34 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
235. 347 U.S. at 523–24, 531–32 (majority opinion) (upholding the deportation of a long-
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misgivings about the constitutional anomalousness of unrestrained
federal authority. Juan Galvan, a thirty-year resident of the United
States who had an American wife and four native-born children, had
been ordered deported because of his brief membership in the
Communist Party in the 1940s.236 The Internal Security Act of 1950 had
established as a matter of law that the Communist Party advocated the
violent overthrow of the U.S. government, thus relieving the
Government of the burden of proving as much.237 Further, under the
Government’s construction of the Act, Congress had also dispensed
with any need to prove that a particular noncitizen Party member was
committed to, or even aware of, the Party’s presumed violent
purpose.238 Although the “power of Congress over the admission of
aliens and their right to remain [was] necessarily very broad,” Justice
Frankfurter mused, “touching as it does basic aspects of . . . foreign
relations and the national security,” the application of that principle in a
case lacking any evidence of the noncitizen’s violent or otherwise
illegal purpose gave him pause.239 “[C]onsidering what it means to
deport an alien who legally became part of the American community,
and the extent to which, since he is a ‘person,’ an alien has the same
protection for his life, liberty and property under the Due Process
Clause as is afforded to a citizen,” the deportation of Galvan “without
permitting [him] to prove that he was unaware of the Communist
Party’s advocacy of violence strikes one with a sense of harsh
incongruity.”240 Because “the essence of due process” is “fair play,”
Justice Frankfurter reasoned, “much could be said for the view, were we
writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope
of [Congress’s] political discretion”241 to regulate the admission and
removal of aliens. Further, “since the intrinsic consequences of
deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said
also that the ex post facto Clause . . . should be applied to
deportation.”242
But alas, “the slate [was] not clean.”243 With respect to Congress’s
plenary authority over immigration, Justice Frankfurter wrote,
term resident alien under a section of the Internal Security Act of 1950 providing for the
deportation of any alien who was a member of the Communist Party at any time after entering
the country).
236. Id. at 532 (Black, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 525–26 (majority opinion).
238. Id. at 526.
239. Id. at 530.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 530–31.
242. Id. at 531.
243. Id.
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There is not merely “a page of history,” . . . but a whole
volume. . . . [T]hat the formulation of these policies is
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as
firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of
our body politic as any aspect of our government.244
Despite such evident discomfort with the severity of the result, the
Justices in the majority were “not prepared to deem [themselves] wiser
or more sensitive to human rights than [their] predecessors,” and thus
upheld Galvan’s deportation.245
Further, even some Justices who reluctantly acquiesced in the
consignment of immigration regulation to the political branches
reserved a role for the courts in ensuring that noncitizens were afforded
due process of law. This was true in exclusion as well as deportation
cases. In Knauff v. Shaughnessy,246 for example, the Court famously
declared that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”247 Yet that
principle, as well as the Court’s decision upholding the exclusion of a
noncitizen based on undisclosed information,248 garnered a bare
majority of only four Justices, with three Justices—Frankfurter, Black,
and Robert Jackson—dissenting.249 The dissenters argued that to
exclude Ellen Knauff, the German wife of an American citizen, without
even a hearing was inconsistent with constitutional liberty.250 “Security
is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name,”
Justice Jackson scolded.251 “The menace to the security of this
country . . . from this girl’s admission is as nothing compared to the
menace to free institutions inherent in procedures of this pattern.”252

244. Id. (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 531–32.
246. 338 U.S. 521 (1950).
247. Id. at 544.
248. See id. at 547.
249. See id. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Two Justices did not participate in the decision.
Id. at 547 (Douglas & Clark, JJ., abstaining).
250. Id. at 550–51 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 551.
252. Id. Id. at 537. Following her exclusion, members of Congress sought to gain Ellen
Knauff’s admission to the U.S. through a private bill. Though the bill stalled in the Senate,
congressional involvement prodded the Attorney General to grant Knauff a full exclusion
hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry. That Board upheld her exclusion, but its decision was
later reversed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The government’s conclusion that
Knauff represented a national security risk rested on nothing more than “unsubstantiated
hearsay,” the BIA concluded, before ordering Knauff admitted to the U.S. as a permanent
resident. See Weisselberg, supra note 49, at 958–64.
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A few years later, Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas
again dissented when a five-Justice majority upheld the exclusion and
indefinite detention of a noncitizen on Ellis Island without a hearing.253
Although courts owed Congress’s and the Executive’s substantive
policy judgments regarding security “[c]lose to the maximum of
respect,” Justice Jackson wrote, “procedural fairness and regularity are
of the indispensable essence of liberty” and would not be surrendered to
legislative discretion.254 Justice Jackson emphatically rejected the
Government’s (imputed) position that the noncitizen apprehended at the
border “has no rights.”255 With respect to procedural due process, at
least, noncitizens stood on equal constitutional footing with citizens. “If
the procedures used to judge this alien are fair and just,” Justice Jackson
explained, “no good reason can be given why they should not be
extended to simplify the condemnation of citizens. If they would be
unfair to citizens, we cannot defend the fairness of them when applied
to the more helpless and handicapped alien.”256
For the four Mezei dissenters, moreover, the denial of a hearing
defied not only constitutional due process but also the essence of
individual freedom and the rule of law.257 Notably, both Justices
Jackson and Black drew explicit parallels between Mezei’s indefinite
detention and the practices of Europe’s most infamous authoritarians.
“[T]he Government’s theory of custody for ‘safekeeping,’” Justice
Jackson observed, had “unmistakable overtones” of the Nazi system of
“protective custody,” under which “the concentration camps were
populated with victims of summary executive detention for secret
reasons.”258 Justice Black similarly objected to “the Court’s holding that
Mezei’s liberty is completely at the mercy of the unreviewable
discretion of the Attorney General.”259 The Soviet People’s
Commissariat and Adolf Hitler’s secret police claimed authority to
253. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–18 (1953). At the time the Supreme Court
issued its decision, Ignatz Mezei had spent three years detained on Ellis Island based on
“national security” reasons that the government refused to divulge. As in the case of Ellen
Knauff, Mezei managed to gain an exclusion hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry. The
Board upheld Mezei’s exclusion, but this time (due to substantial evidence of Mezei’s past
communist activities) the BIA affirmed. Based on the finding that Mezei’s role in the
Communist Party had been only minor, however, the BIA recommended to the Attorney
General that Mezei be paroled into the U.S., and the Attorney General acceded. See
Weisselberg, supra note 49, at 979–84.
254. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 222, 224 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 226–27.
256. Id. at 225.
257. See id. at 217–18 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 218–21, 228 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 225–26 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 217 (Black, J., dissenting).
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imprison or banish both citizens and foreigners based on undisclosed
information,260 he scolded. The American Bill of Rights, however,
served as an essential bulwark against such practices and reflected the
Founders’ abhorrence of “arbitrary one-man imprisonments. Their
belief was—our constitutional principles are—that no person of any
faith, rich or poor, high or low, native or foreigner, white or colored,
can have his life, liberty or property taken ‘without due process of
law.’”261 Taken to its logical conclusion, the consignment of
immigration regulation exclusively to the political departments, free
from judicially enforceable constitutional constraints, was
fundamentally inconsistent with that principle. As Justice Jackson
observed, “differences in the process of administration make all the
difference between a reign of terror and one of law.”262
***
The national security cases of the early 1950s are notable today for
their failure to command anything approaching judicial consensus about
the metes and bounds of the federal immigration power. Although the
holdings in those cases continue to carry significant precedential value,
the opinions themselves go a long way toward unsettling the doctrinal
foundation on which the modern plenary power doctrine rests. Even at
the height of the Cold War, sixty years after the inherent sovereignty
principle had presumably become settled law, and when claims of
national security commanded extraordinary judicial deference, Justices
Black and Douglas continued to reject the rule of Fong Yue Ting.263
Others, such as Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, acquiesced reluctantly
to six decades of precedent but continued to chafe at the patent
unfairness that the doctrine sometimes produced, and to insist on
meaningful procedural safeguards.264 This remarkable lack of consensus
defies the aura of naturalness and inevitability that surrounds the
plenary power doctrine today.
III. TOWARD AN UNEXCEPTIONAL IMMIGRATION POWER
This Part argues that the Supreme Court should disaggregate
immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review, and proposes
that recent developments in constitutional immigration law have begun
to chart a course toward that end. Disaggregating immigration law
260. Id. at 217–18.
261. Id. at 218.
262. Id. at 226 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
263. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598–600 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
264. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–32 (1954).
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would mean recasting federal immigration regulation not as a distinct,
constitutionally privileged subset of foreign affairs and national
security, but rather as ordinary lawmaking akin to Congress’s plenary
power to regulate commerce or to tax and spend for the general welfare.
Federal authority over noncitizens, including noncitizens’ right to enter
or remain within the United States, would thus be constrained by the
same substantive, judicially enforceable constitutional norms that apply
to most other federal lawmaking and enforcement. Section III.A
explains how mainstream constitutional norms have infiltrated the
Court’s immigration opinions in recent decades, and proposes that this
infiltration has begun to erode some of the plenary power doctrine’s key
premises. Section III.B considers how a constitutionally disaggregated
immigration law would operate in three select doctrinal contexts:
eligibility for public benefits, removal, and detention. Finally, Section
III.C begins to theorize a jurisprudential path that the disaggregation of
immigration law could plausibly follow.
A. The Encroachment of Mainstream Constitutional Norms
During the decades following the Cold War cases discussed in Part
II.B, several Justices continued to protest the Court’s insulation of
federal immigration regulation from constitutional review; however,
they generally refrained from the sort of direct challenges that Justices
Douglas and Black expressed in Harisiades.265 Yet in a number of
cases, the Justices have suffused their opinions with the very substantive
constitutional norms that the plenary power doctrine has, in theory,
exiled from constitutional immigration law. Although this Section
focuses on relatively recent developments, the encroachment of
265. Consider Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). There, the Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to the government’s exclusion of Ernest Mandel, a Belgian Marxist
journalist and scholar. Id. at 756, 770. Although the exclusion of Mandel implicated the First
Amendment right of the petitioners (American scholars who had invited Mandel to an academic
conference) to hear Mandel speak, the government’s plenary power to exclude noncitizens
trumped that right. Id. at 765–66. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented. See id. at
770 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 774 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall observed in
passing that the Chinese Exclusion Case, Fong Yue Ting, and the Cold War cases were “not the
strongest precedents in the United States Reports,” but stressed that because “[t]here were no
rights of Americans involved in any of the old alien exclusion cases, . . . their broad counsel
about deference to the political branches is inapplicable.” Id. at 781, 783. The jurisprudential
pillars of the plenary federal power to exclude noncitizens were easily distinguishable and thus
need not be “overruled to strike down Dr. Mandel’s exclusion.” Id. at 782.
It is unsurprising that judicial critics of plenary federal power stopped invoking Justice
Field and Brewer’s Fong Yue Ting dissents, as “citing to dissents risks undermining the
authority of the argument.” Starger, supra note 197, at 1264. Although “[t]he incentive not to
cite dissents is strong,” however, dissents can nevertheless “influence doctrine far more than its
number of citations would indicate. Id.
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mainstream constitutional norms into the Court’s immigration decisions
has been evident for decades. In two cases from the 1970s involving
U.S. citizen petitioners, for example, the Court subjected federal
admission provisions—the inner core of federal “immigration law” and
the subset that bears most directly on national “sovereignty”—to
meaningful, if still highly deferential, constitutional review, even as it
affirmed Congress’s plenary power to exclude noncitizens.266
This Section analyzes two cases decided in the past fifteen years:
Zadvydas v. Davis267 and Padilla v. Kentucky.268 The purpose of the
analysis is twofold. First, it demonstrates the persistent dissatisfaction
among some Justices with both the underlying logic and the practical
consequences of the plenary power doctrine. Second, it proposes that
the continued encroachment of mainstream constitutional norms into the
Court’s immigration decisions has begun to wear a path of doctrinal
development toward the end of plenary federal power and the
disaggregation of immigration law.
1. Zadvydas v. Davis: Constitutional Norms in the Shadow of
Plenary Power
The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Zadvydas v. Davis provides
an especially striking example of how substantive constitutional norms
long banished under the plenary power doctrine nevertheless inform
judicial decision-making in immigration cases. In Zadvydas, the Court
266. In upholding Ernest Mandel’s exclusion on ideological grounds, the Court affirmed that
“the legislative power of Congress [was] more complete over the ‘admission of aliens’ than any
other ‘conceivable subject.’” Indeed, the majority quoted directly from the Chinese Exclusion
Case and its early progeny, and expressly declined to reconsider the long and robust line of
decisions upholding Congress’s plenary power “to exclude aliens altogether form the United
States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this
country, . . . and to have its declared policy enforced exclusively through executive officers,
without judicial intervention.” Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 766 (quoting Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895). Notwithstanding such language, however, the Court also
appeared to condition the exercise of that power on the presence of a “facially neutral bona fide
reason.” Id. at 766, 770 (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339
(1909). A few years later, the Court similarly acknowledged Congress’s “exceptionally broad
power to determine which classes of aliens may lawfully enter the country,” even as it subjected
the challenged law—a provision extending preferential immigration status to the “illegitimate”
children of U.S. citizens mothers but not U.S. citizen fathers—to something approximating
rational basis review. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1976). In so doing, the majority
expressly rejected the government’s position that “substantive policy regulating the admission
of aliens into the United States is not an appropriate subject for judicial review,” instead
observing that “[o]ur cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the
Constitution even with respect to . . . the admission and exclusion of aliens . . . .” Id. at 793 n.5.
267. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
268. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

230

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

held that the government lacked statutory authority to detain indefinitely
Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident noncitizen subject to a final order of
removal,269 and ordered Zadvydas released from federal custody and
paroled into the United States.270 To understand how the Court arrived
at that conclusion is to understand how constitutional norms can infuse
ostensibly non-constitutional review of immigration law.
The federal statute at issue in Zadvydas governed the detention of
removable noncitizens; it provided for a ninety-day statutory “removal
period” following a final order, during which the alien typically would
be held in custody.271 Ordinarily, the Government would remove the
noncitizen within that ninety-day period.272 Because the Government
had been unable to locate a country that would accept Zadvydas,273
however, he remained in custody after the expiration of the ninety-day
removal period, with no realistic prospect of release.274 The
Government claimed the authority to extend Zadvydas’s confinement
indefinitely based on a statutory provision stating that when the
Government fails to remove an alien during the ninety-day removal
period and the Attorney General has determined the alien to be a “risk
to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,” the
alien “may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall
be subject to [certain] terms of supervision.”275 At issue in Zadvydas’s
challenge was whether the quoted language authorized the Government
to detain a noncitizen indefinitely or, as Zadvydas maintained, only for
a “period reasonably necessary” to accomplish removal.276 A fiveJustice majority “construe[d] the statute to contain an implicit
‘reasonable time’ limitation, the application of which is subject to

269. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–85, 702. Specifically, Zadvydas had been convicted of
possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, a deportable offense under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1989–1994). Id. at 684.
270. See id. at 702. Although parole allows an excludable or removable alien to be released
into the United States with or without monitoring and travel restrictions, it is not regarded
legally as admission to the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (2000). Rather, a parolee has the
same (limited) statutory and constitutional rights as an excludable alien at the border. See id.;
Martin, supra note 68, at 57, 71; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
271. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 684. Germany, where Zadvydas was born, declined to accept him because he
was not a German citizen; Lithuania, of which his parents had been citizens, declined to accept
him because he was neither a Lithuanian citizen nor permanent resident; the Dominican
Republic, of which Zadvydas’s wife was a citizen, likewise refused. Id.
274. Id. at 684–85.
275. Id. at 688–89 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1995–2000))
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Id. at 682.
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federal-court review.”277
Given that Zadvydas was, at bottom, a case about statutory
construction, one might have expected the Court’s analysis to center on
the text and perhaps the legislative history of the relevant provision. But
it did not. After setting out the background of the case and establishing
jurisdiction, Justice Stephen Breyer devoted eight pages of his twentyone-page majority opinion to the “obvious” constitutional difficulty
“arising out of a statute that . . . permits an indefinite, perhaps
permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any [judicial]
protection.”278 Although the majority acknowledged that Zadvydas’s
constitutional liberty interest could not serve as the basis for a direct
constitutional challenge to his confinement, it also maintained that the
venerable canon of “constitutional avoidance” required the Court to
attend to the constitutional issue.279 Zadvydas’s Fifth Amendment
liberty interest thus entered into the Court’s analysis somewhat
elliptically, through the “‘cardinal principle’ of statutory
interpretation . . . that when an Act of Congress raises ‘a serious doubt’
as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided.’”280
Even as the majority acknowledged that Zadvydas lacked a legal
right to live at large in the United States and affirmed Congress’s
plenary power over the removal of noncitizens, it nevertheless insisted
that such power was “subject to important constitutional limitations.”281
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint,” Justice Breyer explained, “lies at the
heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment Due Process] Clause
protects.”282 When detention results from a criminal proceeding, the
Constitution provides for “adequate procedural protections” against the
unwarranted deprivation of individual liberty.283 Because the “indefinite
civil detention” at issue in Zadvydas did not trigger comparable
safeguards, however, it was incumbent on the Government to establish
277. Id. Four years later, the Court held that detention of noncitizens deemed inadmissible
was likewise subject to a reasonable time limitation. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386–87
(2005).
278. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692. As Professor David Martin has remarked, Justice Breyer’s
attention to Zadvydas’s liberty interests reflected the majority’s “resolute insistence on viewing
the situation from the perspective of the alien, not the government.” Martin, supra note 68, at
82.
279. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696, 699.
280. Id. at 689 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
281. Id. at 695.
282. Id. at 690.
283. Id.
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“strong special justification[s],” such as “preventing flight” or
“protecting the community.”284 In this case, the Government failed to
make such a showing.
In describing the purported “limitations” on federal authority, Justice
Breyer made a point to discount the relevance of the usual rationales for
buffering federal immigration regulations against constitutional review.
The case did not involve “terrorism or other special circumstances,” he
reasoned, “where special arguments” grounded in national security
might justify “preventive detention and . . . heightened deference to the
judgments of the political branches.”285 Nor was the majority persuaded
that the Government’s sole proffered “foreign policy consideration”—
that judicially ordered release from detention could compromise
“sensitive repatriation negotiations” with Lithuania—was sufficiently
weighty to justify indefinite confinement.286 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that Zadvydas’s Fifth Amendment “liberty interest
[was] . . . strong enough to raise a serious question” about the
constitutionality of “indefinite and potentially permanent”287 detention.
In a context other than immigration, that conclusion would warrant
strict constitutional scrutiny, and thus a judicial inquiry into whether the
challenged provision was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest. By the Court’s own admission, however, the
plenary power doctrine prevented Zadvydas from challenging the
statute directly on Fifth Amendment grounds. “Despite this
constitutional problem,” the majority conceded, if Congress had made
clear its intent in the statute to authorize indefinite detention, “we must
give effect to that intent.”288 In fact, setting aside for a moment the
serious constitutional implications of indefinite, unreviewable detention,
a candid reading of the relevant statutory text favors the Government’s
position that Congress intended to bestow on the Attorney General
broad discretion to detain noncitizens subject to a final order of
removal. Yet the majority, reasoning in the long, perhaps obfuscating
shadow of Zadvydas’s constitutional liberty interest, could not discern
“any clear indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney
General the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered

284. Id. The majority was further troubled by Congress’s apparent delegation to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a mere “administrative body,” of an
“unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental rights.” Id. at 692
(quoting Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)).
285. Id. at 696 (internal quotation marks omitted).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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removed.”289 The ambiguity lay in the provision that a removable
noncitizen “may be detained beyond the removal period.”290 Although
the statute’s use of the word “‘may’ suggests discretion,” the majority
reasoned, “it does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion. In that
respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.”291 Justice Breyer thus concluded
that, “read in light of the Constitution’s demands,” the statute “does not
permit indefinite detention,” but rather “limits an alien’s post-removalperiod detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that
alien’s removal from the United States.”292 Accordingly, the majority
adopted six months as the presumptive period of reasonableness.293
***
Zadvydas illustrates at least two ways in which mainstream
constitutional norms have encroached on constitutional immigration
law. First and most evidently, in constructing the applicable statute the
majority injected into its ostensibly sub-constitutional reasoning what
Professor Hiroshi Motomura has called “phantom constitutional
norms.”294 Second and more subtly, the majority refused to treat as
dispositive one of the plenary power doctrine’s most foundational
categorical presumptions: that courts owe the political branches broad
deference based on the inextricable connection between the regulation
of immigration and the conduct of foreign affairs and national security.
a. Statutory Construction and Phantom Constitutional Norms
Although the plenary power doctrine obliges courts to refrain from
direct constitutional review of substantive immigration law,
constitutional considerations nevertheless frequently operate as
“phantom constitutional norms,” shaping the meaning that courts
ascribe to statutes and administrative regulations.295 By way of
289. Id. at 697.
290. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 & Supp. V 1995–2000) (emphasis added).
291. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697.
292. Id. at 689. Justice Kennedy wrote scathingly in dissent that the “requirement the
majority reads into the law simply bears no relation to the text; and in fact it defeats the statutory
purpose and design.” Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
293. See id. at 701 (majority opinion). The majority based the period of six months on
statements from a 1956 congressional debate suggesting that some members of Congress
considered that detention longer than six months could be constitutionally problematic. Id.
(citing United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957)).
294. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990) [hereinafter
Motomura, Immigration Law].
295. See id. at 548–49. As Professor Motomura explains, the “phantom constitutional
norms” that inform statutory interpretation in immigration law “conflict with the expressly
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illustration, Professor Motomura analyzed a host of cases from the late
1970s and 1980s in which courts very evidently, and often explicitly,
adopted sometimes strained readings of immigration statutes and
regulations in the service of phantom constitutional norms.296 In so
doing, they prohibited the government from, for example,
discriminating against noncitizens on the basis of race and national
origin;297 detaining noncitizens indefinitely pending exclusion or
removal;298 denying due process of law to first-time entrants seeking
asylum;299 and excluding noncitizens on ideological grounds.300 In each
of these contexts, courts recognized that the plenary power doctrine
foreclosed a direct challenge centered on the constitutionally protected
interest at stake, but nevertheless strove (sometimes successfully) to
vindicate those interests through the sub-constitutional means of
statutory construction.
To characterize the constitutional liberty interest at work in
Zadvydas as a “phantom” norm does not imply that it operated
surreptitiously, or even subtly. Indeed, as the preceding overview of the
majority’s analysis indicates, the “serious constitutional problem”301 of
indefinite, unreviewable confinement looms over the entire opinion. At
various points, Justice Breyer misleadingly implied that the alternative
to constitutional avoidance was actually striking down the statute on
articulated constitutional norm—unreviewable plenary power.” Id. at 564. Phantom norms are
nevertheless “‘constitutional’” in that they have been “actually adopted as an expressly
constitutional decision in other areas of law, [and] then carry over to immigration cases, where
they are substantial enough to serve the limited function of informing interpretation of
immigration statutes and other subconstitutional texts.” Id.
296. See id. at 583–600.
297. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 852, 857 (1985) (reading a prohibition against
race or national origin discrimination into a general provision governing the parole of
noncitizens into the United States); see also Motomura, Immigration Law, supra note 294, at
587–93.
298. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387, 1389–90 (10th
Cir. 1981) (holding, after a trenchant and highly critical Fifth and Eighth Amendment analysis
of the Government’s position that it could detain the noncitizen petitioner indefinitely pending
removal, that the INS lacked statutory authority); see also Motomura, Immigration Law, supra
note 294, at 593–95.
299. See, e.g., Chun v. Sava, 708 F.2d 869, 877 (2d Cir. 1983) (reading into the asylum
statutes and regulations a procedural due process right for stowaways to an exclusion hearing at
which they could bring asylum claims, even though first-time entrants generally lacked such a
right); see also Motomura, Immigration Law, supra note 294, at 595–97.
300. See, e.g., Allende v. Schultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (D. Mass. 1985) (reading a
requirement that the Government provide a “‘facially legitimate and bona fide’” reason for
denying a nonimmigrant visa to the widow of former Chilean President Salvador Allende into
the statutory provision on which the petitioner’s exclusion was based); see also Motomura,
Immigration Law, supra note 294, at 597–600.
301. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 638, 690 (2001).
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constitutional grounds. On previous occasions, he counseled, “[w]e
have read significant limitations into other immigration statutes in order
to avoid their constitutional invalidation.”302 The implication is that “the
Constitution’s demands” compelled the majority to read an “implicit
limitation” into the post-removal-period detention statute.303 In fact, the
obvious alternative to rewriting the statute to avoid the constitutional
difficulty was to acknowledge that Congress, in its largely unrestrained
authority to govern immigration, granted the Attorney General broad
discretion to detain certain noncitizens subject to a final order of
removal well beyond the statutory ninety-day removal period.304 In
straining to avoid such a result, the majority opinion incorporated
Zadvydas’s liberty interest as a phantom norm: it directly informed the
disposition of the case—here, the construction of the statute not to
sanction indefinite detention—even though it could not serve as its
direct constitutional basis.
To suggest that Justice Breyer squinted to see ambiguity in the
challenged provision and then read into the statute a time limitation that
Congress surely never contemplated may sound like a criticism. But it is
not intended as one. Yes, the majority’s reading of the word “may” is
strained and hardly stands as an example of textually rigorous statutory
construction. Instead of viewing Justice Breyer’s analysis as an
“unanchored interpretation” of the statute that improperly “nullifies the
statutory purpose,”305 as Justice Kennedy charged in his dissent, the
majority opinion should be understood as a particularly revealing
artifact of the plenary power doctrine. Recall that in Mezei the Court
held that a noncitizen with no right to be present in the United States
could not challenge his indefinite, and perhaps permanent, confinement
as an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.306 Notwithstanding Justice
Breyer’s generally unconvincing attempt to distinguish Mezei,307 it is
302. Id. at 689.
303. Id.
304. Justice Antonin Scalia took this position in his dissent. Zadvydas’s “claim can be
repackaged as freedom from ‘physical restraint’ or freedom from ‘indefinite detention,’” Scalia
maintained. “[I]t is at bottom a claimed right of release into this country by an individual who
concededly has no legal right to be here. There is no such constitutional right.” Id. at 702–03
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
306. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
307. Justice Breyer’s distinction turned on the fact that Mezei, although a long-term
resident of the United States, had been detained at Ellis Island upon his return to the United
States and thus stood in the same position for constitutional purposes as a noncitizen stopped at
the border, whereas Zadvydas was a resident alien facing removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
684, 693 (majority opinion). As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, however, the territorial
distinction on which Justice Breyer relied is informed by the fact that noncitizens present within
the United States, and perhaps especially long-term residents, will generally have a stronger
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difficult to see why, as a purely doctrinal matter, it should not control
the result in Zadvydas. To accept Mezei as controlling precedent,
however, would have been to hold that the Attorney General had the
authority, even absent any bona fide national security interest, to
confine a man for years, and perhaps decades, with no realistic prospect
of release; and to do so, moreover, outside the view of any
constitutional court. That is an extraordinary assertion of sovereign
power, which manifests the plenary power doctrine in its pure,
undiluted form.308 Working under the assumption that Mezei would
continue to define the scope of the Government’s detention authority,
Zadvydas based his challenge not on constitutional grounds but on the
Government’s interpretation of the post-removal provision. It was,
paradoxically, the sub-constitutional nature of the challenge—the fact
that Zadvydas turned on the meaning of a statute—that created doctrinal
space for the phantom constitutional norm. Faced with the alternative of
sanctioning unrestrained governmental authority to deprive a person of
basic human liberty—a proposition that a majority of the Court, like the
Mezei dissenters, found fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional
liberty and the rule of law—Justice Breyer chose to abandon strict
fidelity to congressional intent.309
b. Challenging Immigration’s Presumptive Foreign Affairs–
National Security Nexus
Invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to rewrite the
challenged statutory provision was essentially an evasive maneuver,
through which the majority avoided the logical consequence of plenary
federal power. Even as the Court left the plenary power doctrine itself
intact, however, it also implicitly contravened the doctrine’s essential
warrant for judicial deference: the presumption that immigration
lawmaking and enforcement per se is part and parcel of the political
branches’ authority over foreign affairs and national security.
As this Article explained in Part I, the Court ordinarily presumes as a
matter of course that immigration inherently implicates foreign affairs
claim of right to be present in the United States than a noncitizen who has never been admitted.
Id. at 703–04 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But Zadvydas’s final order or removal had extinguished his
right to remain in the United States. Id. at 703.
308. Recall the Mezei dissents discussed above. See supra notes 253–62 and accompanying
text.
309. Justice Breyer’s analysis likewise reflects a rising judicial consciousness in the wake
of the 1996 reforms (see supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text) that immigration law was
becoming increasingly intertwined with criminal law in constitutionally relevant ways. In this
respect, he anticipated the Court’s explicit engagement with the immigration/criminal law nexus
a decade later, in Padilla v. Kentucky. See infra notes 318–43 and accompanying text.
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and national security—areas in which Congress and especially the
Executive Branch operate largely beyond the purview of the federal
courts. In 2003, for example, the Court upheld the mandatory six-month
detention of a teenage petty criminal who, the Government conceded,
posed neither a flight risk nor a threat to the community. 310 As the
majority explained, “‘any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican
form of government.’”311 “‘[R]easonable presumptions and generic
rules,’ even when made by the INS rather than Congress,” the Court
reasoned, “are not necessarily impermissible exercises of Congress’
traditional power to legislate with respect to aliens.”312
Yet the Zadvydas majority declined to apply the same categorical
presumption. Instead, it specifically considered and rejected the merits
of the sovereignty, security, and foreign affairs rationales advanced by
the Government. Because the specific circumstances of the case did not
“require us to consider the political branches’ authority to control entry
into the United States,” Justice Breyer wrote, ordering Zadvydas’s
release would “leave no ‘unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor.’”313
“Neither do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances” that
might justify “heightened deference to the judgments of the political
branches with respect to matters of national security.”314
Here, Justice Breyer subtly shifted two key pillars of plenary federal
power. First, he implicitly shrank the sphere of immigration regulation
that has been understood to implicate the nation’s inherent sovereignty.
It is no longer immigration per se, understood as the right of noncitizens
to enter and remain within the United States, but rather the “control of
entry.” Second and more fundamentally, Justice Breyer implied that
“heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches” will
not be presumed, but instead requires an affirmative demonstration by
the Government of “special” circumstances, such as terrorism. This is
not the plenary power doctrine of Mezei, or even Demore v. Kim. The
Zadvydas majority rejected the characterization of indefinite detention
as merely an incident of the civil process of removal, and appeared to
place the burden on the Government to provide a specific,
constitutionally weighty justification. Although it was not quite the
heightened scrutiny that the Government’s abridgement of a
310. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513–14 (2003).
311. Id. at 522 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)).
312. Id. at 526 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 313 (1993)).
313. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695–96 (quoting Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
602 (1953)).
314. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
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fundamental liberty typically triggers outside the immigration context,
the majority nevertheless treated as extraordinary the assertion of
authority to deprive Zadvydas indefinitely of his physical liberty, and
insisted that such a deprivation must be justified by “special arguments”
that were particular to Zadvydas’s case.
So, too, did the majority rebuff the Government’s asserted “foreign
policy consideration”—specifically, the risk of interfering with
“‘sensitive’ repatriation negotiations.”315 “[N]either the Government nor
the dissents explain how a habeas court’s efforts to determine the
likelihood of repatriation . . . could make a significant difference in this
respect,”316 Justice Breyer observed. Indeed, even in the context of the
“war on terror,” the Court has declined on several occasions to defer
categorically to the Government’s invocation of national security to
shield from judicial review the indefinite detention of noncitizens.317 In
marked contrast to the Demore Court’s recitation of and reflexive
capitulation to the traditional rationales for constitutional deference, the
Zadvydas majority subjected each of those rationales to critical scrutiny,
ultimately dismissing them as generic and devoid of substance.
2. Padilla v. Kentucky and the Erosion of the Civil–Criminal
Distinction
The Supreme Court destabilized another key pillar of the plenary
power doctrine in the 2010 case of Padilla v. Kentucky: the notion that
because removal from the United States is defined legally as a civil
proceeding rather than criminal punishment, noncitizens subject to
315. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 21, Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No. 997791), 2001 WL 28667, at *21).
316. Id.
317. In Boumediene v. Bush, for example, the Court extended habeas corpus rights to
noncitizen Guantanamo detainees who had been designated “enemy combatants,”
notwithstanding the Government’s asserted interest in “apprehend[ing] and detain[ing] those
who pose a real danger to our security.” 553 U.S. 723, 732, 797 (2008). “In considering both the
procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism,” the
Court acknowledged that “proper deference must be accorded to the political branches.” Id. at
796 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). However,
“[s]ecurity subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles,” it reasoned. Id. at 797. “Chief
among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is
secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these principles that the judicial
authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.” Id. Although Boumediene is not
an immigration case and its implications for constitutional immigration law are far from clear, it
does illustrate how, even in contexts that unambiguously implicate the nation’s security, the
Court is prepared to rebuff the same rationale for judicial deference that undergirds the plenary
power doctrine. For other recent examples of the Court’s refusal to abdicate its role in reviewing
the federal government’s prosecution of the “war on terror,” see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 539 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004).
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removal are not entitled to the suite of rights that protect criminal
defendants against governmental abuses of power.318 As Part I
observed, this means, among other things, that a noncitizen facing the
prospect of removal does not have a Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel, is not entitled to a Miranda warning, and cannot
suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 319 It
was precisely this withdrawal of deportation from the purview of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments that Justice Field condemned in
his Fong Yue Ting dissent.320 Notwithstanding the protests of Justice
Field and others, however, the conceit that deportation is not
“punishment” remains a basic premise of constitutional immigration
law.321
Although Padilla did not directly repudiate the categorical
distinction between civil deportation and criminal punishment, the fiveJustice majority blurred the boundary between them in a way that
necessarily diminishes its constitutional saliency. In brief, the Court
held that a noncitizen criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel322 included receiving competent,
accurate advice about the potential removal consequences of a criminal
conviction.323 The petitioner, José Padilla, was a long-term permanent
resident of the United States who was ordered removed after pleading
guilty to transporting a large quantity of marijuana324—an offense for
which federal law unambiguously mandated removal.325 Padilla then
appealed his conviction on the ground that, prior to entering his plea, his
attorney had falsely advised him that he “did not have to worry about

318. Compare supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text, with Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.
Ct. 1473, 1481–82 (2010).
319. See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 198–215 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (describing detention pending
removal as a constitutionally permissible incident of the civil removal process).
322. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel included the effective assistance of competent counsel determined
by “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms”).
323. Defense counsel’s duty to inform her client about the possible removal consequences
of conviction depends on the relative clarity of the statute, the majority explained. See Padilla,
130 S. Ct. at 1483. Where the “deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or
uncertain,” it reasoned, “[t]he duty of the private practitioner . . . is more limited.” Id. In such
circumstances, she “need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal
charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Id. By contrast, “when the
deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.
324. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1477.
325. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
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immigration status since he had been in the country so long.”326 The
Kentucky Supreme Court denied Padilla post-conviction relief on the
ground that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel did not entitle a criminal defendant to competent advice about
removal.327 Because removal was outside the sentencing authority of the
trial court, the Kentucky Supreme Court reasoned, it was merely a
“collateral” rather than “direct” consequence of Padilla’s criminal
conviction.328 That conclusion, which several federal appellate courts
had also reached,329 was firmly rooted in the Supreme Court’s longstanding position that deportation is a civil proceeding that is
functionally and constitutionally distinct from the criminal proceeding
from which it flows.330
In Zadvydas, the fusion of immigration and criminal law remained in
the background. In overturning the Kentucky Supreme Court, the
Padilla majority placed that fusion at the center of its analysis.331
326. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478 (quoting Kentucky v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky.
2008)).
327. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d at 485.
328. Id.
329. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 n.9 (citing decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits adopting the same position).
330. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, Race,
the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 253, 253 (2002) (observing that collateral civil sanctions that deprive convicted felons
of “the basic rights of membership in society,” though relatively “invisible,” often are the “most
significant penalties resulting from a criminal conviction”).
331. Over the last three decades immigration and criminal law have merged to a remarkable
degree. As one of the leading chroniclers of this building “crimmigration crisis” explains,
“immigration law became infused with the substance of criminal law” in three respects:
First, there has been ‘unprecedented growth in the scope of criminal grounds
for the exclusion and deportation of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens.’ Second,
violations of immigration law are now criminal when they were previously
civil, or carry greater criminal consequences than ever before. Third, recent
changes in immigration law have focused on detaining and deporting those
deemed likely to commit crimes that pose a threat to national security.
Stumpf, supra note 61, at 382 (quoting Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 613 (2003)); see also
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457,
1468–74 (2013); supra notes 62–69 and accompanying text (describing the dramatic expansion
of statutory grounds for removal in 1996). Moreover, the physical experience of immigration
detention is often scarcely distinguishable from prison. As the former Director of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Detention Policy and Planning explains,
despite the legal distinction between “civilly detained and criminally incarcerated inmates,” they
tend to be seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations are
managed in similar ways. Each group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities
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“Although removal proceedings are civil in nature” as a purely formal
matter, Justice Stevens observed, “deportation is nevertheless intimately
related to the criminal process.”332 Further, while American law has
“enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for
nearly a century,”333 in recent decades Congress both radically
expanded the number of deportable offenses and stripped the courts and
the Attorney General of their traditional and often-exercised authority to
grant discretionary relief from deportation.334 Such enactments swelled
the class of noncitizens eligible for deportation at the same time that
they eliminated the traditional means of “ameliorat[ing] unjust results
on a case-by-case basis.”335 The result was to render deportation “an
integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the
penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants.”336 That
development “dramatically raised the stakes of noncitizens’ criminal
conviction”337 and made it “‘most difficult’ to divorce the penalty from
the conviction in the deportation context.”338 The majority was “quite
confident,” Justice Stevens added, “that noncitizen defendants facing a
risk of deportation for a particular offense find it even more
difficult.”339
One might feel cautious about ascribing to Padilla dramatic
implications for constitutional immigration law. After all, Padilla is
arguably not an immigration case at all, but a case about constitutional
criminal rights—particularly, whether one of the many common
“collateral” consequences of a criminal conviction340 is sufficiently

with hardened perimeters in remote locations that are considerable distances
from counsel and their communities. With only a few exceptions, the facilities
that the government uses to detain immigrant inmates were originally built, and
currently operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced felons.
Their design, construction, staffing plans, custody management strategies, and
operating standards are based largely upon corrections principles of command
and control.
Dora Schriro, Improving Conditions of Confinement for Criminal Inmates and Immigrant
Detainees, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1441, 1444–45 (2010) (footnote omitted).
332. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
333. Id.
334. See id. at 1478–79.
335. Id. at 1479.
336. Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1481 (quoting United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (C.A.D.C. 1982),
abrogated by Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473).
339. Id.
340. As Justice Samuel Alito observed in dissent, Padilla’s case happened to involve
removal, but a criminal conviction can also lead to “civil commitment, civil forfeiture, the loss
of the right to vote, disqualification from public benefits, ineligibility to possess firearms,
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serious or integral to the criminal process that defense counsel’s failure
to address it competently would constitute “ineffective assistance”
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. That is true as far as it
goes; and in this respect, Padilla concerns the rights of criminal
defendants who happen to be noncitizens rather than the rights of
immigrants qua immigrants.
But the real meaning of Padilla for constitutional immigration law
may lie in what it tells us about how the five Justices in the majority
understand removal. First, the majority emphasized and gave concrete
legal effect to the often-extraordinary personal, familial, and economic
stakes of removal. As this Article noted above, various Justices have at
times acknowledged that deportation can carry momentous stakes, even
characterizing it as a form of “banishment” or “exile.”341 Almost
invariably, however, such recognition has come in dissents and
concurrences; or, if in a majority opinion, as an expression of regret on
the way to holding that the plenary power doctrine forecloses the relief
sought. In Padilla, by contrast, the majority stressed the enormous
stakes of removal as a reason to expand the constitutional rights of
noncitizen criminal defendants.342
Second, the majority suggested that the legislative reforms of the
past two decades have changed the constitutional meaning of
removal.343 Removal is no longer an extraordinary sanction reserved for
the worst offenders but rather a routine, yet no less weighty, element of
both the criminal justice and immigration systems.344 In this new legal
environment, the traditional civil–criminal distinction rang hollow. To
defend the withholding of an important constitutional right from a
criminal defendant facing banishment on the ground that removal is a
civil rather than criminal proceeding, or a collateral rather than direct
dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, and loss of business or professional licenses.”
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1488 (Alito, J., dissenting).
341. See Bridges v. Wixon, 327 U.S. 125, 160–61, 163 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring);
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
342. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1480–82. One can be heartened by the Padilla Court’s
recognition of the extent to which removal has become intertwined with criminal law, but also
worry that importing criminal law norms such as effective assistance of counsel into the
immigration context could have the unintended long-run effect of weakening established
constitutional criminal protections. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Strickland-Lite:
Padilla’s Two-Tiered Duty for Noncitizens, 72 MARYLAND L. REV. 844, 854 (2013) (arguing
that, by extending a watered-down version of the Strickland guarantee to noncitizen criminal
defendants, Padilla risks eroding “the baseline Sixth guarantee of the right to effective
assistance of counsel” outside the immigration context, as well).
343. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478–80.
344. See id. at 1478 (“The ‘drastic measure’ of deportation or removal is now virtually
inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.” (quoting Fong Haw Tan v.
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))).
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consequence of conviction, increasingly suggests an elevation of
formalism over substance—a point Justice Stevens underscored when
he contemplated the irrelevance of the collateral versus direct issue
from the perspective of a noncitizen defendant.345 Inherited labels such
as “civil” or “collateral” would not be dispositive of constitutional
rights.
B. Disaggregating Immigration Law
As this Article has discussed, denominating a statute or enforcement
action directed at noncitizens an immigration law triggers a singular
form of exclusively federal, extra-constitutional authority. The
constitutional exceptionalism is firmly rooted in the categorical
presumption that “any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican
form of government.”346 This Section argues that the Supreme Court
should retire that presumption, and with it the notion that the regulation
of noncitizens comprises a discrete, constitutionally privileged domain
of distinctly “political” subject matter. The effect would be to
disaggregate immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review
and approach the regulation of noncitizens for what it is—a variegated
conglomeration of laws and enforcement actions concerning labor,
crime, public health and welfare, and, sometimes, foreign affairs and
national security.
Stripped of its presumptive connection to foreign affairs or national
security, the federal government’s authority to regulate immigration
would remain “plenary” in the traditional sense. As Chief Justice John
Marshall explained nearly two centuries ago, “[i]f . . . the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, is vested in Congress . . . absolutely.”347 Indeed, when
the Court adopted the plenary power doctrine in 1889,348 Congress had
already exercised such “plenary” authority over immigration for at least
fifteen (and arguably sixty) years pursuant to its commerce power.349
345. See id. at 1481–82.
346. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81
n.17 (1976)).
347. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).
348. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 606
(1889) (stating that decisions by Congress to exclude aliens are “conclusive upon the
judiciary”).
349. See supra Section II.A. (discussing City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837) and
Smith v. Turner & Norris v. City of Bos. (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283 (1849)).
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Under a constitutionally unexceptional immigration power, the
authority to govern the right of noncitizens to enter or remain within the
United States would remain both broad and presumptively federal;350
however, that authority would be constrained by the same substantive,
judicially enforceable constitutional norms that apply when Congress
regulates commerce or taxes and spends for the general welfare.
Critically, the disaggregation of immigration law would give full
expression to noncitizens’ constitutional personhood. The individual
right at issue, rather than the fact of noncitizenship or the categorical
label immigration law, would frame the court’s review. A law or
enforcement action that employed a suspect classification, infringed a
noncitizen’s fundamental liberty interest, or had a chilling effect on free
expression or association would be subject to strict scrutiny and upheld
only if the government could demonstrate that it was necessary, or at
least “narrowly tailored,” to serve a compelling government interest.351
Generic recitations of “foreign policy” or “national security” would lose
their talismanic quality and cease to operate as trumps for meaningful
constitutional review. Instead, reviewing courts would assimilate
350. Notwithstanding continued federal supremacy, the disaggregation of immigration law
would implicate immigration federalism. Retiring the presumptive connection between
immigration and foreign affairs entails reimagining much immigration-related lawmaking as
ordinary, constitutionally unexceptional regulation of labor, crime, and public welfare—matters
that historically were the province of the states, and which today the states and the federal
government govern concurrently, subject to conventional preemption principles. Disaggregating
immigration law would enable reviewing courts to acknowledge that a state law adopted
pursuant to a declared policy of “attrition through enforcement” is for all intents and purposes a
regulation of immigration, without rendering it automatically preempted. See supra notes 101–
10 and accompanying text. On the one hand, it is doubtful that this acknowledgement would
significantly expand the states’ domain of immigration-related lawmaking because such
regulation would remain highly constrained by field and conflict preemption principles. See
Huntington, supra note 101, at 850–52. However, it may enable reviewing courts to attend more
candidly to the true purpose and effect of laws such as Arizona SB 1070—a candor that could
be helpful in discerning whether a challenged provision conflicts with a policy of Congress. For
an enlightening analysis of the federalism implications of an unexceptional immigration power,
see Schuck, supra note 101, at 66 (in light of the “federalist default” arrangement under which
most federal programs are administered cooperatively with states and localities, “in principle
immigration should not be different, though the precise mix of federal and state authority and
responsibility is and must always be domain-specific”); Stumpf, supra note 101, at 1565
(“Reimagining immigration law as a domestic affair linked with employment, welfare, and
crime is bound to expand judicial acceptance of state and local participation in immigration
control.”).
351. The Court’s formulation of the strict scrutiny inquiry has not been entirely consistent.
At times the Court has indicated that the challenged provision must be “necessary” to achieving
a compelling governmental purpose. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237
(1995). At other times, however, the Court has indicated that the challenged provision need only
be “narrowly tailored” toward that end. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
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foreign policy and national security considerations into the strict
scrutiny inquiry in the form of particularly compelling governmental
interests. Foreign policy and national security would thus continue to
serve as constitutionally viable warrants for laws burdening noncitizens,
but the onus would lie with the government to demonstrate that such
interests were meaningfully served by the constitutional denial at issue.
Recognizing noncitizens’ full constitutional personhood would
neither dissolve the legal distinction between citizens and aliens nor
preclude the government from regulating immigrants as immigrants. As
with constitutional challenges outside of the immigration context, the
basic elements of strict scrutiny—the constitutional right at issue, the
government’s interest in the challenged law, and the relative congruence
between that interest and the regulatory means adopted352—would
remain highly context-sensitive. Even if the constitutional singularity of
immigration law were dissolved, many of the categorical distinctions
that currently inform both statutory and constitutional immigration
law—for example, the distinction between would-be first-time entrants
and long-term permanent residents, or between undocumented and
documented immigrants—would remain constitutionally salient.353
352. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
353. Consider Professor Martin’s proposal for formalizing a “clear and candid system of
graduated [constitutional] protections”:
Aliens, at least if present here, may be members of a relevant community they
share with citizens, and are thus entitled to . . . certain rights and subject to
certain reciprocal duties. But there are different levels of membership, or
different circles of community, and additional reciprocal duties and rights, or at
least more stringent protections of rights, will come into being for persons as
they move to higher circles of membership.
Martin, supra note 68, at 137, 89. Accordingly, Professor Martin offers a working “hierarchy of
membership levels” in which U.S. citizens “occupy the highest rung of the community
membership ladder,” followed by lawful permanent residents, admitted nonimmigrants, entrants
without inspection, parolees, and, finally, applicants at the border. Id. at 92.
Even in the context of admission decisions—the legal setting in which a noncitizen
occupies the lowest rung of Martin’s membership hierarchy—the Supreme Court has on
occasion undertaken meaningful, if still highly deferential, constitutional review. See
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (denial of foreign scholar’s visa application must be
based on a “facially neutral bona fide reason”); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1976) (statutory
provision extending preferential immigration status to “illegitimate” noncitizen children of U.S.
citizen mothers but not U.S. citizen fathers is subject to “limited judicial review” to ensure a
rational basis); Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (slip op.) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (denial
of visa application of noncitizen spouse of U.S. citizen must be based on a “facially legitimate
bona fide reason”); see also supra note 265–66 and accompanying text (discussing Kleindienst
and Fiallo). To be sure, such cases are exceptional and, not coincidentally, were all brought by
U.S. citizens whose constitutional interests were directly impacted by the challenged

246

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

The constitutional import of those distinctions, however, would be
registered in the terms of conventional means–ends scrutiny—in the
strength of the noncitizen’s constitutional interest; the compelling-ness
of the government’s regulatory interest; and the requisite narrowness of
tailoring. For example, in a substantive due process challenge to a
noncitizen’s detention pending removal, a governmental interest in
protecting public safety or preventing flight is much more compelling
than an interest in administrative efficiency. So, too, is the removal of a
noncitizen that knowingly funded an organization that sponsors
terrorism vastly better calibrated to serve the government’s compelling
interest in protecting national security than the removal of a noncitizen
thrice convicted of minor drug offenses. Nor would the requirements of
procedural due process consist in a “fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances.”354 As the Court famously explained in
Mathews v. Eldridge, “‘due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’”355 Indeed,
it is precisely that flexibility that has allowed procedural due process to
operate as a “surrogate” for substantive constitutional values that the
plenary power doctrine ostensibly suppresses. Disaggregating
immigration law would simply weigh those values against the relevant
governmental interests in a formal, candid way.
The remainder of this Section offers a brief illustration of how a
disaggregated, constitutionally unexceptional immigration power would
operate in practice, centering on three distinct regulatory contexts:
eligibility for public benefits, removal, and detention.
1. Eligibility for Public Benefits
As Part I noted, the Supreme Court has approached federal laws
conditioning eligibility for federal benefits or employment on U.S.
citizenship or length of residency as immigration laws. That
governmental action. But they do suggest that a system of “graduated constitutional protections”
is, as Martin proposes, already implicit in immigration law’s statutory and constitutional
infrastructure.
354. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
355. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). Eldridge set forth three
factors for assessing the requirements of due process: the “private interest that will be affected
by the official action; . . . the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” Id. at 335. In the context of immigration regulation, this would mean, for example, that
the constitutional liberty interest of a thirty-year lawful resident threatened with removal would
be afforded much greater weight than that of an undocumented first-time entrant apprehended
near the border.

2016]

DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW”

247

classification decision spares what are, to all appearances, quintessential
“alienage” regulations from meaningful constitutional review. As the
Diaz Court explained, because “the relationship between the United
States and our alien visitors . . . may implicate our relations with foreign
powers,” the regulation of noncitizens had been “committed to the
political branches of the Federal Government.”356 That commitment in
turn “dictate[d] a narrow standard of review” in matters of immigration
and naturalization.357 Consider the extraordinarily categorical nature of
the Court’s presumption that such regulations implicate foreign affairs.
It is enough that the relationship between the United States and its
“alien visitors” may, in some undefined manner, bear on the nation’s
relationship with some unspecified foreign power. The Court’s rationale
for deference is a generic one, lacking any suggestion that this
particular exercise of federal authority—a statutory denial of Medicaid
benefits to which the petitioners would otherwise be entitled—has any
plausible application to the “reasons that preclude judicial review of
political questions.”358
The constitutional stakes of classifying the challenged regulation as
356. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (emphasis added).
357. Id. at 82. Relying on Diaz, federal courts later upheld provisions of the 1996 Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, excluding lawful permanent residents from various
means-tested federal welfare programs. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342,
1353 (11th Cir. 1999); City of Chicago v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 1999); Abreu v.
Callahan, 971 F. Supp. 799, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
358. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81–82. Notwithstanding the Court’s invocation of foreign affairs and
the political question doctrine (see supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text; supra note 47),
one can plausibly read Diaz more as a conventional equal protection case than an example of
immigration exceptionalism. As Hiroshi Motomura observes, “Diaz took a constitutional
challenge to an alienage law seriously, in contrast to immigration law decisions that rely on
plenary power.” HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (2006). Although it is true that Justice
Stevens’ unanimous opinion did indeed “carefully examine” the challenged Medicare
eligibility’s requirement, conscientiously assessing its reasonableness rather than “rejecting out
of hand the argument that the rule was unconstitutional,” (id.; see also supra note 14), it is
nevertheless difficult to account for the Court’s highly deferential posture toward an admittedly
suspect classification without acknowledging the great influence of the plenary power doctrine.
Consider, again, the stark divergence between the Diaz Court’s declaredly “narrow” standard of
review and the Graham Court’s heightened scrutiny of state alienage classifications, which,
“like those based on race,” burdened a “discrete and insular minority” and were thus “inherently
suspect.” See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
Characterizing Diaz as a plenary power decision is not intended to suggest that the Court
abdicated any role in assessing the constitutionality of the provision. In fact, in reviewing the
challenged provision for a rational basis, the Court employed a conventional form of
constitutional analysis. Rather, Diaz is very much a plenary power case because the Court
applied a different, and vastly more permissive, standard of scrutiny than it would have applied
if the challenged classification had not been labeled an “immigration law.”
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an immigration law become clear when Diaz is contrasted with the
Court’s approach to analogous state laws. Even long before alienage
was designated a “suspect classification” for equal protection purposes,
the Court made clear that the plenary federal power to regulate
immigration permitted Congress to employ race and alienage
classifications in ways that the states could not. In its “broad
constitutional powers in determining what aliens shall be admitted to
the United States, the period they may remain, [and the] regulation of
their conduct,” the Court explained in 1948, the federal government
could govern noncitizens “in part on the basis of race and color
classifications.”359 It did not follow, however, that “a state can adopt
one or more of the same classifications to prevent lawfully admitted
aliens within its borders from earning a living in the same way that
other state inhabitants earn their living.”360
Then, in 1971, the Court added alienage to the constitutional roster
of suspect classifications, alongside race and national origin. As this
Article discussed above, in Graham v. Richardson the Court applied
strict scrutiny to a state law conditioning eligibility for welfare benefits
on a term of residency or U.S. citizenship.361 Traditionally states
retained “broad discretion” under equal protection principles to engage
in social and economic regulation, the Court explained, but
“classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race” were “inherently suspect.” Regardless of whether the challenged
regulation impacted a fundamental right, noncitizens were “a prime
example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate.”362 Two years after Graham, the Court
reviewed a Connecticut law excluding aliens from the practice of law
under heightened constitutional scrutiny.363 In striking down the law,
the Court not only affirmed noncitizens’ full constitutional personhood,
359. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–19 (1948).
360. Id. at 418–20 (striking down a California law restricting eligibility for commercial
fishing licenses to citizens); see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 365, 374 (1886). Before 1971, states could discriminate against aliens so long as the
discrimination served a special public interest—a standard that permitted a broad array of
alienage classifications. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220–21 (1923) (recognizing a
special public interest in denying aliens the right to own land); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 176,
189–90, 194 (1915) (upholding New York law prohibiting the employment of aliens on public
works projects); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145–46 (1914) (recognizing a special
public interest in prohibiting aliens from hunting wild game).
361. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
362. Id. at 371–72 (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene
Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
363. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1973); see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 643 (1973) (striking down the provision of New York Civil Service Law restricting
eligibility for certain positions within the state civil service to citizens).
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but also stressed that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support
the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other
ways to our society.”364 Accordingly, it was “appropriate that a State
bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of employment
opportunities.”365
Once alienage classifications became subject to strict scrutiny, the
only thing standing between the regulation of noncitizens by Congress
or the President and the “heavy burden” of justification imposed on the
states was the categorical presumption that federal regulations were
immigration laws that implicated distinctly national interests. In fact, in
its sole decision striking down a federal alienage classification,
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,366 the Court starkly illustrated both the
remarkable power of that presumption and what it might mean to
abandon it. On the same day that it decided Diaz, the Court in Hampton
invalided a federal citizenship requirement for employment in the
competitive civil service on the ground that the federal agency that
promulgated the regulation—the Civil Service Commission (CSC)—
failed to demonstrate that Congress had delegated its plenary power to
govern immigration to the agency.367
As it did in state alienage cases such as Graham and Griffiths, the
Court recognized that the noncitizen plaintiffs held important
constitutional interests that the citizenship requirement infringed. The
Court worried that the CSC rule disfavored “an identifiable class of
persons” who were “already subject to disadvantages not shared by the
remainder of the community.”368 Although the Court formally declined
the noncitizen respondents’ request to review the rule under heightened
constitutional scrutiny, it nevertheless emphasized that the citizenship
requirement “deprive[d] a discrete class of persons of an interest in
liberty on a wholesale basis.”369
Even without invoking the “suspect classification” framework, the
Court undertook an unusually searching examination of the CSC’s
364. Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722.
365. Id. at 722. Notwithstanding heightened constitutional scrutiny, the Court has upheld
citizenship requirements for state positions involving a “political function.” See, e.g., Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 447 (1982) (upholding state requirement of U.S. citizenship for
peace officers). State alienage classifications bearing on democratic self-government are
likewise subject to only rational basis scrutiny. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647–48 (upholding
the denial to noncitizens of the right to vote or hold public office); Perkins v. Smith, 370 F.
Supp. 134, 138 (D. Md. 1974) (upholding the exclusion of noncitizens from jury service), aff’d,
426 U.S. 913 (1976).
366. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
367. See id. at 116.
368. Id. at 102.
369. Id. at 102–03.
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justification. It was true that the CSC’s argument “drew support from
both the federal and the political character of the power over
immigration and naturalization,” the Court acknowledged, and that an
“overriding national interest[]” might thereby justify “a citizenship
requirement in the federal service even though an identical requirement
may not be enforced by a State.”370 Yet the federal immigration power
was not “so plenary that any agent of the National Government” could
“arbitrarily” single out noncitizens for unfavorable treatment,371 the
Court insisted. Rather, “[w]hen the Federal Government asserts an
overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule
which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State,
due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that
the rule was actually intended to serve that interest.”372 The CSC had
cited various familiar “national interest[s]” as a warrant for judicial
deference, including aiding the President in his dealings with “foreign
powers,” providing an incentive for “aliens to qualify for
naturalization,” and ensuring “undivided loyalty in certain sensitive
positions.”373 Yet the Court rejected these rationales. Because the CSC
lacked “direct responsibility for fostering or protecting” such interests,
the Court would not assume that those interests had influenced the
promulgation of the citizenship requirement.374
To be sure, because the Hampton Court declined to apply the kind of
heightened constitutional scrutiny that would normally be triggered
when the government employs a suspect classification,375 it stopped
short of subjecting federal regulation of noncitizens to mainstream
constitutional norms. Moreover, as a matter of constitutional doctrine,
Hampton merely stands for the proposition that if Congress wants to
delegate its plenary authority to discriminate against noncitizens in
ways that, if enacted by a state, would violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must do so explicitly. Indeed,
immediately following its rejection of the various “national interest[s]”
advanced by the CSC, the Court suggested that “if the rule were
expressly mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume
370. Id. at 101.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 103.
373. Id. at 103–04.
374. See id. at 103–05. The CSC “has no responsibility for foreign affairs, for treaty
negotiations, for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization
policies.” Id. at 114.
375. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (subjecting federal
race-based affirmative action program to strict scrutiny); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89
(1979) (subjecting discrimination between mothers and fathers in the federal Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program to intermediate scrutiny).
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that any interest which might rationally be served by the rule did in fact
give rise to its adoption.”376 In other words, the Court would have
employed the same rational basis scrutiny that it did in Diaz, if
necessary by searching the speculative universe for legitimate national
interests that the discrimination might plausibly serve. In fact, following
the Court’s decision in Hampton, President Gerald Ford issued an
executive order reinstituting the citizenship requirement,377 and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the order on the basis
of Hampton—a result the Supreme Court declined to review.378
More important than Hampton’s limitations as a constitutional
holding, however, is the manner in which it models scrutiny of the
federal government’s usual justifications for judicial deference. In the
absence of a virtually automatic presumption that any federal regulation
of noncitizens serves uniquely federal interests, the government would
need to persuade a reviewing court both that compelling national
interests were genuinely at issue and that the citizenship requirement
was specifically tailored to serve those interests—not as a categorical
matter on the basis of an asserted generic connection to foreign affairs
or naturalization, but with respect to the particular job categories to
which it applied. In Hampton, the Court objected in particular to the
conspicuous mismatch between the challenged requirement and the
national interests that it was purported to serve. Mow Sun Wong, the
lead plaintiff, for example, had been an electrical engineer in China but
under the CSC regulation “was ineligible for employment as a janitor
for the General Services Administration.”379 After the President reissued
the citizenship requirement, however, reviewing courts continued to
operate under the presumption that a regulation excluding an otherwise
qualified noncitizen from employment as a janitor was an immigration
law that implicated ineluctably federal interests and thus warranted a
high degree of constitutional deference.
Under a disaggregated immigration law, a reviewing court would
approach the President’s executive order as the “inherently suspect”
376. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 103. The majority apparently withheld judgment on whether
Congress or the President could enact the challenged requirement in order to gain the votes of
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who joined the opinion on the condition that the Court had
“reserved the equal protection questions that would be raised by congressional or Presidential
enactment of a bar on employment of aliens by the Federal Government.” Id. at 117 (Brennan,
J., concurring).
377. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 41 C.F.R. § 37301 (1976). The Order provided, inter alia,
that “[n]o person shall be given any appointment in the competitive service unless such person
is a citizen or national of the United States.” Id.
378. Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 905
(1979).
379. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 91.
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alienage classification that it is, and uphold the discrimination only if
the government could prove that it was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest. Considerations of foreign policy or
national security would remain available to the government as
constitutionally viable warrants for a citizenship requirement, but would
be assimilated into the reviewing court’s strict scrutiny inquiry as
government interests. The government would therefore bear the burden
of demonstrating that the requirement was narrowly tailored to serve
such interests—a burden that it would be unlikely to satisfy with respect
to many civil service positions.
2. Removal
The Supreme Court has long regarded laws governing the right of
resident noncitizens to remain within the United States to occupy the
inner core of federal immigration policy.380 Consider Galvan v.
Press,381 a poster child for the virtual immunity of the deportation
process from substantive constitutional review. As Section II.B
explained, Juan Galvan was a thirty-year resident of the United States
who had been ordered deported on the ground that he was briefly a
member of the Communist Party, years before the Internal Security Act
of 1950 made such membership automatic grounds for deportation.382
Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion upholding Galvan’s deportation
serves as a virtual catalogue of constitutional derelictions: of the “harsh
incongruity” of deporting a constitutional “person” who had long been
“part of the American community” and was innocent of any
wrongdoing;383 of Galvan’s Fifth Amendment substantive due process
right to individual liberty, which should, as a matter of principle, apply
to deportation; and of the inapplicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to
retroactive grounds for deportation. If only the Court were “writing on a
clean slate,” Justice Frankfurter lamented, much could be said for
“qualif[ying] the scope of [Congress’s] political discretion” in
immigration matters.384 Unfortunately, however, the “slate [was] not
clean.”385 Because “[p]olicies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their
right to remain here” touched “basic aspects of national sovereignty,
more particularly our foreign relations and the national security,” the
formulation of those policies had been “entrusted exclusively to

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 731 (1893).
347 U.S. 522 (1954).
Id. at 523.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
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Congress.”386 A half-century later, a majority of the Court continued to
accept this essential framework, reaffirming the “civil” nature of
deportation proceedings and holding that a noncitizen ordered deported
could not bring a selective prosecution challenge alleging that he was
singled out for deportation due to membership in a politically unpopular
group.387
As with the administration of federal benefits and employment, this
virtual immunity from judicially enforceable constitutional constraints
rests on the presumption that immigration laws are, as a categorical
matter, part and parcel of the conduct of foreign affairs and national
security. Unlike eligibility for welfare benefits or employment in the
federal civil service, however, laws that define the conditions of
inclusion within both U.S. territory and the American polity do seem to
involve the nation’s sovereignty in a direct and palpable way. To
acknowledge that the presence of noncitizens in the United States
implicates national sovereignty, however, in no way requires that the
authority to govern their presence operates outside the scope of robust
constitutional review.
Disaggregating immigration law would retire the reflexive conflation
of removal with foreign affairs and national security, and thereby give
full expression to the constitutional norms that the Court suppressed in
Galvan. In practice, this would mean that a noncitizen could challenge
the substantive grounds of a removal order. The statute at issue in
Galvan, for example, would be vulnerable on multiple counts. First and
most evidently, a provision requiring a noncitizen’s physical
apprehension and permanent expulsion from his long-time place of
residence would be understood to deprive him of his Fifth Amendment
substantive due process right to liberty.388 In fact, the Court has long
recognized that deportation implicates a noncitizen’s Fifth Amendment
liberty interest and that he is thus entitled to due process of law before
he can be expelled from the country.389 If the Court were to decouple
386. Id. at 530–31.
387. In Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., the Court rejected First and Fifth
Amendment challenges brought by noncitizens claiming that the Government had targeted them
for deportation due to their affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. See
525 U.S. 471, 473–74, 491–92 (1999). “An alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional
right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.” Id. at 488.
388. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (Deportation places “the liberty of an
individual . . . at stake. . . . Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits
a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this
land of freedom.”).
389. See Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597 (1953) (holding that a noncitizen is entitled
to “notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing . . . before an executive or administrative
tribunal” before he can be “expelled and deported”). As the Court has explained in another
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removal from foreign affairs and national security, thus bringing it out
of the shadow of plenary federal power, the deprivation of liberty that
the removal process necessarily entails would trigger strict
constitutional scrutiny. The Government would therefore bear the heavy
burden of demonstrating that the challenged removal provision was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.390
Further, under a disaggregated immigration law the classification of
removal as a civil proceeding would no longer limit the applicability of
constitutional guarantees intended to protect criminal defendants against
governmental overreaching.391 For example, the Supreme Court has
context, the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause “denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 299 (1923)). Such a capacious understanding of constitutional liberty surely includes, as in
Juan Galvan’s case, the right to remain in the country where one has lived for three decades and
of which one’s spouse and children are citizens.
390. A noncitizen in Galvan’s position likewise could challenge the statutory grounds for
removal as an “unconstitutional condition” on his First Amendment right to free speech and
association. Even when a person lacks a “right” to a governmental benefit or privilege, the
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972). To permit the government to “penalize[] and inhibit[]” the exercise of
constitutional freedoms would allow it to “produce a result which it could not command
directly.” Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). By making Galvan’s
fleeting membership in the Communist Party grounds for deportation, even absent any evidence
that Galvan actually subscribed to the Party’s declared support for the violent overthrow of the
U.S. government, the Internal Security Act imposed an unconstitutional condition on his First
Amendment right of association. On unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARVARD L. REV. 1413 (1989). Although the
government’s interest in preserving the nation’s security surely qualifies as compelling, the
extraordinary breadth of the class of persons that Congress made deportable—any noncitizen
who knowingly joined the Communist Party, without regard to the timing or duration of
membership, the noncitizen’s motives in joining the Party, his personal history of obedience to
the law or loyalty to the country, or whether he actually shared the Party’s objectionable
political commitments—strongly suggests that the provision was insufficiently narrowly
tailored.
391. Numerous scholars have challenged the civil classification of removal and argued that
the removal process should be subject to various constitutional constraints. See, e.g., Beth
Caldwell, Banished for Life: Mandatory Detention of Juveniles as Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2261, 2277, 2280 (2013) (arguing that because deportation is
often “imposed to punish,” it should be subject to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishments); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and
Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889,
1894–95 (2000) (“Although the Court has repeatedly distinguished deporation from punishment
and has characterized deporation as civil, this does not mean that every deporation law is

2016]

DISAGGREGATING “IMMIGRATION LAW”

255

long held that the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause392 applies only to
criminal punishment. Accordingly, the retroactive imposition of civil
burdens generally cannot be challenged as ex post facto laws.393 As
Padilla v. Kentucky suggests, however, the Court increasingly may be
willing to look past the formal criminal–civil distinction to the actual
function and meaning of removal. As the Padilla majority explained,
the statutory reforms of the preceding two decades have made
deportation “an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important
part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants.”394
In fact, the Court has acknowledged outside the removal context that
when a statutory scheme challenged under the Ex Post Facto Clause is
clearly “punitive either in purpose or effect,” a “civil label is not always
dispositive.”395 If the Court were to reject the constitutional
immune from constitutional scrutiny.”); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal
Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal
Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 289, 290–91 (2010) (arguing that “the determination
whether to expel a noncitizen whom the government has previously invited into the national
community as a lawful permanent resident is [better understood as] a criminal proceeding, in
which the defendant is entitled to the full panoply of criminal procedural protections guaranteed
by the Constitution”); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality
Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 417–18 (2012) (arguing that removal is “sufficiently
punitive to trigger proportionality review” under the Due Process Clause and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause).
392. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
393. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798); see also Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S.
451, 460–61 (2001) (defining ex post facto laws exclusively as those that retroactively impose
criminal punishment). Although a law imposing retroactive civil consequences currently can be
challenged under the Due Process Clause, it will not be subject to heightened scrutiny. In Usery
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., for example, the Court rejected a due process challenge to a
provision of the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972 requiring mine operators to provide
compensation for former employees’ death or disability due to illness caused by employment in
mines, even if such employment ended prior to the adoption of the Act. See 428 U.S. 1, 19–20
(1976). The Court reasoned that because the provision was a “rational measure” for spreading
the cost of injury and not a “wholly unreasonable” means of “providing benefits to those who
were most likely to have shared the miner’s suffering,” it satisfied the requirements of due
process. Id. at 18, 25–26. Under a constitutionally unexceptional immigration power, however,
the threat of removal would implicate a noncitizen’s Fifth Amendment liberty interest, thus
triggering heightened scrutiny.
The Court has repeatedly stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to deportation.
See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955) (stating that retroactive application of
new grounds for deportation is not an impermissible ex post facto law); Harisiades, 342 U.S.
580, 594–95 (1952) (determining that constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does
not apply to deportation).
394. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (footnote omitted).
395. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997). Relatedly, the Supreme Court has
resisted the retroactive application of removal provisions when it would conflict with “‘familiar
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectation.’” INS v. St. Cyr, 533
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exceptionalism of the removal process, laws that “prescribe[d] exile for
prior innocent conduct” (as Justice Douglas described the provision at
issue in Galvan) would look much more like impermissible ex post
facto laws.396 The Court would likewise need to revisit its long-standing
position that the exclusionary rule does not apply in the context of civil
removal proceedings.397 The U.S. government’s “obligation to obey the
Fourth Amendment . . . [would] not [be] lifted simply because the law
enforcement officers were agents of the [INS], nor because the evidence
obtained by those officers was to be used in civil deportation
proceedings.”398
Finally, by dissolving the reflexive presumption that removal is part
and parcel of foreign affairs, the disaggregation of immigration law
would mean finally overturning the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong
Yue Ting—grim monuments to the legalized racism of the pre-civil
rights era399—and subjecting discrimination based on race or nationality
to strict constitutional scrutiny. In Fong Yue Ting, the Court had warned
that anything short of an absolute power to control the presence of
foreigners within U.S. territory could subject the nation to “the control
U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358 (1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (construing statutory provision eliminating discretionary waivers of removal for
noncitizens convicted of an aggravated felony not to apply to noncitizen criminal defendants
who pleaded guilty prior to the effective date of the statute). The Court reasoned that this would
create the “potential for unfairness” to the noncitizen criminal defendant. Id. at 323. “As our
cases make clear,” Justice Stevens (also the author of Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473) instructed, “the
presumption against retroactivity applies far beyond the confines of criminal law.” Id. at 324.
396. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“For joining a
lawful political group years ago—an act which he had no possible reason to believe would
subject him to the slightest penalty—petitioner now loses his job, his friends, his home, and
maybe even his children, who must choose between their father and their native country.”).
397. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). Lopez-Mendoza applied the
framework set out in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) for determining to which
noncriminal proceedings the exclusionary rule should apply. This involved weighing the “likely
social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence” against the costs to both law
enforcement and the administrative efficiency. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.
398. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1052 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Austin T.
Fragomen, The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights and the
Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 31–32 (1978)
399. This is more than a hypothetical or symbolic issue. “Although the [INA] generally
prohibits discrimination on the basis of [race and other factors], the [IIRIRA] created a
substantial exception, authorizing the State Department to use race (as well as religion, sex, and
other factors) in establishing visa application procedures and locations.” Gabriel J. Chin,
Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (footnotes omitted). Professor Jack Chin further
observes that a majority of federal circuit courts have affirmed in recent decades that, under the
plenary power doctrine, not only may “aliens . . . be excluded or deported on the basis of race
without strict scrutiny, but also that such racial classifications are lawful per se.” Id. at 3–4
(footnote omitted).
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of another power.”400 “The right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any
class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in
peace,” the Court declared, was “an inherent and inalienable right of
every sovereign and independent nation.”401 Many readers might find it
incredible that 120 years later the presumptive nexus between
immigration and foreign affairs continues to insulate even blatant racial
discrimination from robust constitutional review.
Critically, the constitutional mainstreaming of immigration law
would not prevent courts from taking full account of circumstances in
which the removal of a noncitizen is meaningfully connected to the
conduct of foreign affairs or the preservation of national security, or
where it is vital that the nation “speak with one voice.” By dissolving
the presumptive conflation of immigration with foreign affairs,
disaggregation would shift the burden to the government to demonstrate
that the challenged removal order was narrowly tailored to serve such
an interest. Noncitizens faced with the prospect of removal would not
cease to be constitutional “persons” within the meaning of the First and
Fifth Amendments merely because they are the objects of the
immigration power.
In short, disaggregating immigration law would ensure constitutional
protections commensurate with the human stakes of banishment. In this
respect, it would merely reinstate what the author of the Chinese
Exclusion Case considered the essential constitutional bulwarks of
individual liberty against “[a]rbitrary and despotic power.”402 After
refocusing the constitutional analysis on the liberty of the person, the
fact that removal proceedings involve the right of a noncitizen to remain
in the United States enhances rather than diminishes the importance of
judicially enforceable constitutional constraints. As Justice Douglas put
it six decades ago, “[t]he right to be immune from arbitrary decrees of
banishment certainly may be more important to ‘liberty’ than the civil
rights which all aliens enjoy when they reside here.”403
3. Detention
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,404
some courts and commentators surmised that the Justices were poised to
recognize noncitizens’ Fifth Amendment right to challenge the
400. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (quoting Chae Chan Ping
v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)).
401. Id. at 711.
402. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting).
403. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
404. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 269–93 and
accompanying text.
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lawfulness of their confinement.405 That expectation was dashed just
two years later in Demore v. Kim,406 however, when the Court upheld a
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requiring the
detention of certain removable noncitizens for the duration of their
removal proceedings.407 The Court affirmed that federal immigration
regulations were due considerable constitutional latitude because “‘any
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations,
the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of
government.’”408 Here, again, the categorical presumption of a vital
nexus between any regulation of a noncitizen’s right to be present in the
United States, on one hand, and foreign affairs or national security, on
the other, serves as a warrant for blanket deference to Congress or the
President. Disaggregating immigration law would dissolve that
presumption, thus extending to detained noncitizens the same
constitutional guarantees of individual liberty that apply virtually any
other time that the government incarcerates someone.
The particular circumstances surrounding Hyung Joon Kim’s
detention reveal the speciousness of that presumption. Kim was a longterm permanent resident who had lived in the United States since age
six.409 He had become subject to removal after he was twice caught
shoplifting and later convicted of burglary for breaking into a tool shed
with some high school friends—all within a ten-month period when he
was eighteen and nineteen years old.410 Because a provision of the INA
subjected “aggravated felon[s]” (which Kim was by virtue of his three
criminal convictions) to mandatory detention pending removal, and
notwithstanding the Government’s express determination that he posed
neither a flight risk nor a threat to the community, Kim had been
405. See, e.g., Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 224–25 (4th Cir. 2002), abrogated by
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2002); Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1255–56 (10th Cir.
2002), abrogated by Demore, 538 U.S. 510; Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 308–10 (3rd Cir.
2001), abrogated by Demore, 538 U.S. 510; Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary
Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002).
406. 538 U.S. 510.
407. See id. at 531 (upholding the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012)). As Professor David
Cole has observed, Demore is the “only non-wartime Supreme Court decision to uphold
preventive detention without the procedural safeguards” that generally apply in “preventive
detention” contexts, including the detention of foreign nationals suspected of terrorism. David
Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 693, 716 (2009).
408. Demore, 538 U.S. at 522 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)).
409. Id. at 513.
410. Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 343 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
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detained without bail for more than six months.411 The Court never
explained exactly how Kim’s detention bore on foreign relations, war,
or republican government.
Kim’s challenge centered on the mandatory nature of the detention
statute. Kim argued that, as a lawful permanent resident, his Fifth
Amendment substantive due process right to individual liberty entitled
him to an individualized bond hearing before the Government could
confine him at length.412 Because the Attorney General had essentially
conceded that there was no individualized justification,413 the
Government staked its defense of Kim’s detention on Congress’s
plenary authority to govern immigration.414 The majority acknowledged
that the Fifth Amendment entitled aliens to due process of law in
deportation proceedings,415 but denied that due process required the
Government to consider the particular circumstances of Kim’s case.416
Rather, “reasonable presumptions and generic rules” were “not
necessarily impermissible exercises of Congress traditional power to
legislate with respect to aliens.”417
A “generic rule” denying individual bail hearings was thus
permissible so long as Congress had evidence that some aliens released
on bail would skip their removal hearings and “remain[] at large in the
United States unlawfully.”418 In the context of immigration, that truism
was a sufficient answer to the fact that this particular permanent resident
411. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513 & n.1, 531. The INS had declared sua sponte during the
district court proceeding “that Kim ‘would not be considered a threat’ and that any risk of flight
could be met by a bond of $5,000.” Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For background on the Demore case, see Taylor, supra note 410, at 343–76.
412. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 540; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
(“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”).
413. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 541 (“The INS has never argued that detaining Kim is
necessary to guarantee his appearance for removal proceedings or to protect anyone from danger
in the meantime.” (footnote omitted)).
414. See id. at 528 (majority opinion).
415. Id. at 523.
416. See id. at 523–26 (discussing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) and Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)).
417. Id. at 526 (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 313). A half-century earlier, before immigration
became entangled with criminal law to the extent that it has today, the Court suggested
otherwise. Detention was “necessarily a part of [the] deportation” process because some “aliens
arrested for deportation would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the pendency
of deportation proceedings.” Carlson, 342 U.S. at 538. But “[o]f course purpose to injure could
not be imputed generally to all aliens subject to deportation.” The federal immigration statutes at
issue thus had vested the federal courts with “discretion” to judge that the circumstances
required the detention of a particular alien without bail. Id.
418. Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. The meaning of that evidence was hotly disputed. See id. at
562–68 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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did not pose a flight risk. Kim’s substantive due process right to
freedom from confinement was subordinated to the “generic rule” of
mandatory detention,419 even though (by the Government’s own
concession) the rationale for that rule did not apply to his case. “[W]hen
the Government deals with deportable aliens,” the Court declared, “the
Due Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome
means to accomplish its goal.”420
Disaggregating immigration law would give the lie to the
implication that Kim’s detention—and most detentions pending removal
are—“‘vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies
in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the
maintenance of a republican form of government.’”421 Courts could thus
approach the detention of noncitizens for what it often is: The extended
incarceration by the U.S. government of persons entitled to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment.422 Justice David Souter’s dissenting
419. Id. at 526, 528 (majority opinion) (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 313).
420. Id. at 528.
421. Id. at 522 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976)). Scholars have
issued persuasive challenges to the Court’s continued insistence that the detention of noncitizens
pending removal is properly classified as “civil.” Professor César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández argues, for example, that even prior to the 1996 reforms, in the 1980s and early
1990s, Congress understood immigration detention “as a central tool in the nation’s burgeoning
war on drugs.” César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61
UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014). By “drastically expand[ing] the executive branch’s power—
and at times obligation—to confine people pending immigration proceedings,” Congress created
a “legal architecture that, in contrast with the prevailing legal characterization, is formally
punitive.” Id.; see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 42, 43 (2010) (arguing that “excessive immigration detention” ushered in by the
increasing “convergence” of immigration and criminal law have “evolved into a quasi-punitive
system of immcarceration”). The implication, and perhaps premise, of such accounts is that the
“civil” label is doing the legal and analytical work of exempting the confinement of noncitizens
from constitutional safeguards. In some respects, of course, it is; but the problem runs deeper
than mislabeling. As Justice Souter’s dissent in Demore v. Kim makes clear, in various
nonimmigration contexts, due process entitles persons threatened with involuntarily civil
commitment to individualized consideration of their potential dangerousness before they are
“locked away.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 551–52 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Considered in this light, the question becomes why noncitizens detained for extended
periods pending removal are not entitled to the same individualized consideration as other civilly
detained persons. The answer, this Article argues, lies in the inherent sovereignty rationale for
plenary federal power, and particularly the presumptive connection between immigration
regulation and foreign affairs and national security.
422. That deprivation of liberty, moreover, often has serious “cascading” effects on a
noncitizen’s ability to bring a substantive challenge to his removal order. As legal scholar Mark
Noferi explains, an LPR subject to mandatory detention
may never have a chance to meaningfully challenge [his removal]
determination with counsel. He may be detained in substandard conditions for
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opinion modeled what it would mean to take Kim’s constitutional
liberty interest seriously; and, by extension, what an unexceptional
immigration power would look like. “The Court’s holding that the
Constitution permits the Government to lock up a lawful permanent
resident of this country when there is concededly no reason to do so
forgets over a century of precedent acknowledging the rights of
permanent residents, including the basic liberty . . . lying at the heart of
due process,”423 Justice Souter declared.
The analytical starting point is the right itself: All persons within
U.S. jurisdiction are entitled to the protection of the Due Process
Clause. The Constitution’s protection of liberty and property is
particularly compelling with regard to long-term permanent residents
(LPRs), Justice Souter reasoned, because LPRs are encouraged by the
immigration laws to “establish a life permanently in this country by
developing economic, familial, and social ties indistinguishable from
those of a citizen.”424 The “attachments fostered” through a host of legal
mechanisms are “all the more intense for LPRs brought to the United
States as children,” who, like Kim, may lack meaningful familial or
linguistic connections to their country of citizenship and who often
grow up “considering the United States as home just as much as a
native-born, younger brother or sister entitled to United States
citizenship.”425 In short, Kim’s constitutional liberty interest was
scarcely distinguishable from that of a U.S. citizen.
In light of Kim’s clear constitutional right and because freedom from
physical restraint lies at the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, Justice Souter continued, “the Fifth Amendment
permits detention only where ‘heightened, substantive due process
months or years—often far more time than he served for the crime—due to
massive immigration court backlogs and the absence of speedy trial
protections. Worse, his detention without counsel will deny him a fair chance to
challenge his deportation from family, work, and property in the United States .
...
Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right to Appointed Counsel for
Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 66
(2012) (footnote omitted). Indeed, “[t]hose who are represented and not detained at the time of
[their] merits hearing are twenty-five times more likely to obtain a successful outcome as those
who [are] unrepresented and detained.” Id. at 75.
423. Demore, 538 U.S. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the
Court has stated in a related context, “‘[i]n our society liberty is the norm,’ and detention
without trial ‘is the carefully limited exception.’” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).
424. Demore, 538 U.S. at 543–44.
425. Id. at 544–45. As Justice Souter noted, Kim’s mother was a citizen and his father and
brother were LPRs. Id. at 545.
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scrutiny’ finds a ‘sufficiently compelling’ governmental need.”426 The
fact that Kim’s physical confinement took place in the context of a
removal proceeding did not make it any less a deprivation of
constitutional liberty. To determine what process is due before
“someone is locked away,”427 Justice Souter thus looked outside the
immigration context to pretrial detention of criminal defendants and to
involuntary civil commitment.428 Based on that frame of reference, he
concluded that “due process requires a ‘special justification’ for
physical detention that ‘outweighs the individual’s constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint’ as well as ‘adequate
procedural protections.’”429
When liberty is the rule and confinement the exception, there must
be a “sufficiently compelling’ governmental interest to justify”
detention, and the “class of persons subject to confinement must be
commensurately narrow and the duration of confinement limited.”430
“By these standards,” Justice Souter concluded, “Kim’s case is an easy
one.”431 The statute’s fatal flaw was its denial to Kim, and to other
noncitizens in removal proceedings, of individualized consideration.
Instead, the statute “select[ed] a class of people for confinement on a
categorical basis and den[ied] members of that class any chance to
dispute the necessity of putting them away.”432 Constitutional liberty
“would mean nothing if citizens and comparable residents could be
shorn of due process by this sort of categorical sleight of hand.”433 This
is the heightened scrutiny absent from the majority opinion and from the
plenary power doctrine generally.
C. Toward an Unexceptional Immigration Power
The transition to a constitutionally unexceptional immigration
power is unlikely to be accomplished all at once in a dramatic act of
judicial overturning. Rather, the developments documented in this Part
suggest what constitutional theorist David Strauss has termed a
“common law” model of constitutional change.434 As Strauss explains,
the formal overturning of anachronistic or otherwise undesirable
constitutional rules typically occurs less as a radical break with
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Id. at 549 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
Id. at 551.
See id. at 550–51.
Id. at 557 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001)).
Id.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 551–52.
Id. at 552.
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 36–37 (2010).
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precedent than as a ratification of doctrinal changes that have already
taken place.435 Strauss describes a process of doctrinal evolution in
which a problematic rule becomes hollowed out over time. In order to
avoid objectionable outcomes in particular cases, Strauss explains,
courts adopt various exceptions to the rule or subtly modify the terms of
its application, all the while affirming their continued fidelity to the
existing rule.436
By way of illustration, Strauss describes the decline of the so-called
“separate but equal” doctrine. In the four decades before the Court
decided Brown v. Board of Education, he explains, it issued a string of
decisions declaring that the racially segregated facility challenged in
each case was not in fact equal.437 As a consequence, by the time Brown
was before the Court, “the trend was unequivocal: it had been decades
since the Court had actually found a system of segregation that it
believed satisfied the principle of separate but equal.”438 Even as Plessy
v. Ferguson’s precedential authority remained undiminished in theory,
the “separate but equal” principle for which it stood was “in a
shambles.”439 In short, though the Court’s decision in Brown is often
viewed as a dramatic triumph of constitutional principle, the “rule” of
Brown—that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal—
was announced only after decades of decisions had rendered “separate
but equal” a hollow shell.440
The legal developments analyzed in Section III.A suggest that the
decline of the inherent sovereignty model may be following a similar
course. Zadvydas and Padilla unsettled key premises of the
contemporary plenary power doctrine: The presumptive nexus between
immigration and foreign policy, and the classification of removal as a
mere “civil” process, respectively.441 In Zadvydas, in particular, the
Court showed great solicitude toward a noncitizen’s constitutional
liberty interest, thus implanting a bedrock constitutional value into a
doctrinal setting—immigration law—where such norms typically find
little purchase.442 Moreover, while those two decisions have received
disproportionate attention from scholars and advocates, they are hardly
outliers in the Supreme Court’s recent immigration jurisprudence.443 As
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.
favoring

See id. at 35, 79, 85.
See id. at 85–92.
See id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 90.
See supra Subsection III.A.1.
See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
For example, in rejecting a 2001 equal protection challenge to a citizenship statute
non-marital children born abroad to U.S. citizen mothers over non-marital children
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Dean Kevin Johnson observes, for the past five Terms the Court has
adopted a remarkably unexceptional posture when reviewing
immigration-related lawmaking and enforcement, typically applying
ordinary, “generally applicable principles of statutory interpretation,
rules of deference to administrative agencies, and . . .[a strong
presumption against] retroactive application of changes in the law and
[conventional] federal preemption,” while virtually never invoking the
plenary power doctrine.444
If the Court continues this broad trend—of scrutinizing the
government’s invocation of foreign affairs or national security; of
reading statutes creatively to subject federal immigration law to
“important constitutional constraints”; of eroding the constitutional
born abroad to U.S. citizen fathers, the Court conspicuously did not avert to plenary power, and
instead reviewed the provision under the “intermediate scrutiny” framework that it customarily
applies to governmental discrimination on the basis of sex. Nguyen v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 56–57, 60 (2001).
444. Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of
Immigration Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 111–12 (2015). For example, the Court
has on multiple occasions rejected BIA interpretations of statutory removal provisions that
improperly expanded the meaning of “aggravated felony.” See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 1678, 1686–87 (2013) (holding that under the proper interpretation of a federal removal
statute, a noncitizen convicted in state court of marijuana possession with intent to distribute
was not convicted of an “aggravated felony”); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 379 (2011)
(rejecting as “arbitrary and capricious” the BIA’s “policy for deciding when resident aliens may
apply to the Attorney General for relief from deportation”); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130
S. Ct. 2577, 2580, 2581–82 (2010) (holding, contrary to the BIA’s position, that for second or
subsequent simple drug possession offenses to qualify as “aggravated felonies,” the prosecutor
must have charged the “existence of the prior simple possession conviction before trial, or
before a guilty plea”). Even when the Court has sided with the government and against the
noncitizen, Dean Johnson explains, it has done so by way of conventional statutory construction
and administrative law principles, rather than the kind of broad, reflexive deference that
historically has characterized judicial review of federal immigration-related lawmaking and
enforcement. See Johnson, supra, at 127–29. Finally, as noted above, in federal preemption
cases such as Arizona and Whiting, the Court applied conventional conflict preemption rules,
essentially analyzing the challenged laws as ordinary regulations of labor, business, or crime
rather than “immigration laws” per se. See supra notes 101–10 and accompanying text. Based
on such decisions, Dean Johnson concludes that the Court has “silently moved away from
anything that might be characterized as an immigration exceptionalism,” and imagines a
plausible future in which the plenary power doctrine is relegated to history. Johnson, supra at
64. But see Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (grounding broad deference to the
Executive regarding the issuance of immigrant visas in plenary federal power over
immigration). See generally Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary
Power!, 114 MICH L. REV. FIRST IMP. 2122–23 (observing that Kerry v. Din reflects a Court that
is not yet prepared to “discard the plenary power doctrine entirely,” but also uncomfortable with
the wholesale insulation of substantive immigration law from constitutional review, and
suggesting that the Justices may be “confused and divided about how to bring the doctrine down
for a gentle landing”).
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salience of the civil–criminal distinction and giving legal weight to the
often-enormous human consequences of removal; and of deciding most
immigration cases on legally unexceptional grounds—it is not difficult
to imagine a future in which the inherent sovereignty rationale has
become a shell of its former self, occasionally recited ceremonially but
rarely, if ever, determining the outcome of particular cases. When that
day arrives and a majority of the Court is prepared to acknowledge that
the plenary power doctrine has faded into irrelevance, the Chinese
Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting will appear as decayed artifacts of a
bygone era.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the Supreme Court should abandon the
long-standing presumption that the regulation of noncitizens comprises
a discrete, constitutionally privileged domain of distinctly political
subject matter that is inextricably linked to foreign affairs and national
security. As Section I.A explains, that presumption functions as the
logical lynchpin of the modern plenary power doctrine, under which the
authority to regulate immigration is inherent in national sovereignty,
untethered from the Constitution and buffered against judicial review.
Notwithstanding its aura of naturalness and inevitability, the
constitutional exceptionalism of the federal immigration power is a
relatively recent invention and has always been an object of dissent and
protest among the Justices. As Part II demonstrates, at the time of the
nation’s founding and for nearly a century thereafter, American policy
makers and judges did not conceive of immigration per se as a
substantively or constitutionally discrete subject of lawmaking. The
decidedly unexceptional manner in which both state and federal law
regulated noncitizens migrating to and residing within the United States
defies the constitutional singularity of a distinct class of exclusively
federal immigration laws. The immigration cases decided at the height
of the Cold War, in turn, reflect the continued absence of judicial
consensus about the metes and bounds of the federal immigration
power. Although those cases solidified the principle of plenary federal
power, they are equally notable for their vigorous dissents insisting that
the consignment of immigration exclusively to the political departments
of the federal government, free from judicially enforceable
constitutional constraints, is fundamentally inconsistent with
constitutional liberty and the rule of law.
Part III then demonstrated how mainstream constitutional norms have
encroached in recent decades into constitutional immigration law. Cases
such as Zadvydas and Padilla unsettled key premises of immigration
exceptionalism. The Zadvydas majority not only declined to defer to the
President in a removal matter, instead placing the burden on the
Government to provide a specific, constitutionally weighty justification
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for Zadvydas’s indefinite detention; it also specifically considered and
rejected the Government’s asserted foreign policy rationales for judicial
deference. The Padilla majority, in turn, blurred the boundary between
civil deportation and criminal punishment in a way that necessarily
diminishes that boundary’s constitutional saliency. Zadvydas and Padilla
thus bespeak the dissatisfaction on the Court with both the underlying
logic and practical consequences of the plenary power doctrine;
moreover, they signal a refusal among some Justices to be bound by the
categorical presumptions that currently justify deference to the “political”
judgment of Congress or the President. Disaggregating immigration law
would dissolve those presumptions and subject immigration-related
lawmaking and enforcement—including but not limited to the
administration of federal benefits, removal, and detention—to the same
constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equality that apply
when Congress regulates commerce among the several states or taxes and
spends for the general welfare.
Although the disaggregation of immigration law would fundamentally
transform the constitutional landscape within which Congress and the
President govern immigration, such a transformation is unlikely to be
accomplished through some audacious act of judicial overturning. As Part
III suggests, the impulse already exists in the important, if indirect,
influence of mainstream constitutional norms on the Court’s immigration
decisions; in the Justices’ skepticism toward the categorical presumption
that immigration is part and parcel of foreign affairs and national
security; and in the Justices’ willingness to press the government to
justify the deference that it customarily receives as a matter of course. In
the absence of a precipitous mass migration to the United States or
another catastrophic episode of foreign terrorism, this trend is likely to
continue.445
At present, that impulse is visible at the margin of the Court’s
immigration jurisprudence, expressed most directly in dissents but
occasionally also seeping into its majority decisions in the context of
criminal defense or through statutory construction. By disaggregating
immigration law once and for all, the Court can give full expression and
effect to that impulse, and thus end noncitizens’ century-long constitutional
exile.

445. Johnson, supra note 444, at 65–66.

